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Morris: Morris: Imputed Interest Corollary

AN "IMPUTED INTEREST"
COROLLARY TO THE
"CONSTRUCTIVE TRANSFER"
DOCTRINE: PAY THE TAX OR
FOLLOW THE LEDER?*
Malcolm L. Morris**

I.

INTRODUCTION

Society has long recognized arranging one's financial affairs to minimize
tax exposure as a legitimate taxpayer prerogative.' Unfortunately, when the
chosen technique works too well, the government is wont to respond
negatively and cry, "Foul!" Sometimes the government's position deserves
support even though the taxpayer has engaged in a licit transaction.2 Other

* Estate of Leder v. Commissioner, 89 T.C. 235 (1987), appeal docketed
sub nom., Leder v. Commissioner, No. 88-1125 (10th Cir. Sept. 25, 1989).
** Professor of Law, Northern Illinois University; B.S. 1969, Cornell University; J.D. 1972, State University of New York at Buffalo School of Law; L.L.M.
1977, Northwestern University.
1. In Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809, 810 (2d Cir. 1934), aff'd, 293
U.S. 465 (1963), Justice Learned Hand stated the principle, "Any one may so
arrange his affairs that his taxes shall be as low as possible; he is not bound to
choose that pattern which will best pay the Treasury; there is not even a patriotic
duty to increase one's taxes." In addition, Chamberlain v. Commissioner, 207 F.2d
462, 468 (6th Cir. 1953) (citations omitted), stated, "The general principle is well
settled that a taxpayer has the legal right to decrease the amount of what otherwise
would be his taxes, or altogether avoid them, by means which the law permits;
and that the taxpayer's motive to avoid taxation will not establish liability if the
transaction does not do so without it."
2. Approving certain activities could undermine the efficacy of a particular
statutory provision. See, e.g., United States v. Estate of Grace, 395 U.S. 316 (1969)
(applying the reciprocal trust doctrine to force tax accounting under section 811(c)(1)(B)
of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939-current version of I.R.C. § 2036 (1982 &
Supp. 1987)-despite the fact the decedent never actually engaged in the actions
required by a plain reading of the statute); Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465
(1935) (applying I.R.C. § 112(g), (i) (1928) to the seemingly non-taxable reorganization of a corporation for the purpose of causing income tax accounting on the
transaction); United States v. Allen, 293 F.2d 916 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 368
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times, it is the taxpayers who, having worked properly within established
parameters, deserve approbation of their actions. The clash of these interests
is particularly noticeable in the estate tax arena,3 principally because the
levy is a one time charge. 4 With a transaction designed to achieve a given
tax effect, the attendant revenue loss may never be recovered.
Nowhere is the estate tax problem more acute than when life insurance
purchased by the decedent is owned by someone other than the deceasedinsured. In these situations, the government has successfully raised a "constructive transfer" theory6 under section 2035 of the Internal Revenue Code7
to include insurance policies in the decedent's gross estate,8 even though

life estate pursuant to I.R.C. § 811 (c)(1)(B)(ii) (1939)-current version at I.R.C.
§ 2036 (1982 & Supp. 1987)-even though the taxable interest was sold for adequate
consideration prior to death). Approval could also undermine the revenue collection
system itself. See, e.g., Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111 (1930) (ruling that anticipatory
assignments of income would not be given tax effect, thereby preventing the entire
revenue system from possibly being undermined by extensive taxpayer use of such
arrangements).
3. I.R.C. §§ 2001-2663 (1982 & Supp. 1987).
4. Although the estate tax is a tax unto itself, it is part of an overall
transfer tax system which also includes the gift tax (I.R.C. §§ 2501-2600 (1982 &
Supp. 1987)) and the generation-skipping transfer tax (I.R.C. §§ 2601-3100 (1982)).
There are interrelationships between the estate tax and the other transfer taxes,
but none of these impact on the incidence of the estate tax, which is fixed by
death. Whereas taxpayers may make transfers that dictate the filing of more than
one gift tax return or accompanying generation skipping tax schedules, there is
but one estate tax return to be filed and one final accounting to be had.
5. Although other taxes have fixed taxable periods, there is some interplay
among the periods themselves. For example, income taxes are annual charges, but
there are carrybacks to prior years and carryovers into future years generated in
one tax year that can impact actual liabilities in other tax periods. See, e.g., I.R.C.
§ 172 (1982 & Supp. 1987). Although prior gift tax transactions can impact the
ultimate estate tax liability, the estate tax liability becomes immutable once it is
established. See I.R.C. § 2001(b) (1982).
6. This term means those situations in which an insured permits another
to procure an insurance policy on the insured's life. The insured either directly or
indirectly furnishes the consideration for the policy.
7. I.R.C. § 2035 (1988). Section 2035 of the Internal Revenue Code is the
so-called "contemplation of death" or "three year-transfer" provision. It was
designed to prevent dissipation of the estate tax base through transfers made near
the end of one's life, but currently applies only to a few limited situations such
as life insurance transfers. See infra notes 26-55 and accompanying text for a
detailed discussion of section 2035.
8. The starting point for computing the estate tax is the "gross estate,"
a wealth transfer analog to gross income I.R.C. § 61 (1982 & Supp. 1987). Section
2031(a) provides, "The value of the gross estate of the decedent shall be determined

by including to the extent provided for in this part, the value at the time of his

death of all property, real or personal, tangible or intangible, wherever situated."
I.R.C. § 2031(a) (1988). Sections 2033 to 2042 and section 2044 identify specific
assets which are to be included in the gross estate. I.R.C. §§ 2033-2042, 2044 (1982
& Supp. 1987) (amended 1987). Sections 2043, 2045 and 2046 provide other rules
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol54/iss3/4
which impact directly oil the gross estate computation. See I.R.C. §§ 2043, 2045,
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the deceased-insureds never possessed any technical taxable powers9 over
the policy. Recently, in Estate of Leder v. Commissioner,0 the Tax Court
concluded that "constructive transfers" of life insurance no longer required
the strict scrutiny they were previously given. The constructive transfer
doctrine, while perhaps still alive," was deemed to be meaningless as far
as the application of section 2035 to life insurance transfers was concerned.
The court noted that constructive transfers of life insurance fail the new
"transferred interest" test 12 of section 2035 and, therefore, avoid estate
taxation.
It is uncertain whether this surprising taxpayer victory will withstand
further judicial or congressional review. Consequently, a refocus on whether
the constructive transfer doctrine still has an estate tax role for transfers

of life insurance and, if so, how important it is seems warranted. More
importantly, the inquiry should determine whether constructive transfers
move along "imputed interests." Indeed, it may be necessary to recognize

an "imputed interest" corollary to ensure the proper application of section
2035 to "constructive transfers" of life insurance policies.
II.

THE ESTATE TAX TREATMENT op LwE INSURANCE: AN OVERVIEW

Life insurance proceeds are directly included in a decedent's gross estate
in a number of ways. The first two are mandated by the primary insurance

9. Section 2042 provides the test for the inclusion of insurance payable
upon a decedent's death. I.R.C. § 2042 (1988). See infra notes 13-15 and accompanying text for a discussion of section 2042 and the "taxable powers."
10. 89 T.C. 235 (1987) (Leder-now on appeal to the 10th Circuit-has
recently been followed by Estate of Headrick v. Commissioner, 93 T.C. 18 (1989)).
A decedent established an irrevocable intervivos trust with a bank as trustee. The
trust agreement drafted by the decedent authorized, but did not require the bank
to invest the trust principal in life insurance policies. The bank exercised independent
discretion in acquiring a whole life insurance policy on the decedent's life. The
decedent contributed cash annually to the trust in amounts sufficient to meet the
trust's cumulative monthly premium obligations. The decedent died within three
years of the trust's purchase of the policy. The court held that the decedent never
possessed 'incidents of ownership' in the life insurance policy within the meaning
of I.R.C. section 2042. Id.
11. See id. The Leder court stated, "We hold that the proceeds from the
policy are not includable in the gross estate where the decedent did not possess
at the time of his death, or at any time in the three years preceding his death,
any of the incidents of ownership in the policy ....

In so holding, we do not

reach the issue of whether there was a transfer within the meaning of section
2035(a)." 89 T.C. at 238 (emphasis added). While Leder did not reach the transfer
issue, it is clear it could have only found one under a constructive transfer theory.
See infra notes 84-144 and accompanying text.

12. 89 T.C. at 242-44. Section 2035(d)(2) requires inclusion of insurance
proceeds only if a transfer of an interest in the policy occurred within three years
of a decedent's death, which, if retained, would have had to have been included
in theby gross
estate.
I.R.C.School
§ 2035(d)(2)
(1982). Repository,
See infra 1989
notes 49-55 and accomPublished
University
of Missouri
of Law Scholarship
panying text.
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inclusion provision, section 2042.'1 Inclusion results if the proceeds are
payable to the executor of the estate 14 or if the decedent died seized of
any "incident of ownership."' 5 Although not entirely free of interpretation

13. I.R.C. § 2042 (1982). Section 2042 provides:
The value of the gross estate shall include the value of all property (1) Receivable by the executor - To the extent of the amount receivable
by the executor as insurance under policies on the life of the decedent.
(2) Receivable by other beneficiaries - To the extent of the amount
receivable by all other beneficiaries as insurance under policies on the life
of the decedent with respect to which the decedent possessed at his death
any of the incidents of ownership, exercisable either alone or in conjunction
with any other person. For purposes of the preceding sentence, the term
'incident of ownership' includes a reversionary interest (whether arising by
the express terms of the policy or other instrument or by operation of
law) only if the value of such reversionary interest exceeded 5 percent of
the value of the policy immediately before the death of the decedent. As
used in this paragraph, the term 'reversionary interest' includes a possibility
that the policy, or the proceeds of the policy, may return to the decedent
or his estate, or may be subject to a power of disposition by him. The
value of a reversionary interest at any time shall be determined (without
regard to the fact of the decedent's death) by usual methods of valuation,
including the use of tables of mortality and actuarial principles, pursuant
to regulations prescribed by the Secretary. In determining the value of a
possibility that the policy or proceeds thereof may be subject to a power
of disposition by the decedent, such possibility shall be valued as if it
were a possibility that such policy or proceeds may return to the decedent
or his estate.
Id.
14. Id. § 2042(1). Section 20.2042-1(b) of the Treasury Regulations provide
that the estate does not have to be specifically named as a beneficiary under the
policy. See Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-1(b) (as amended in 1988). If the proceeds are
payable to another beneficiary who is subject to a legally binding obligation to
pay taxes, debts or other charges enforceable against the estate, the amount of
the proceeds required to satisfy the obligation are includable in the gross estate.
Id. The regulation also provides that proceeds are deemed to be receivable for the
benefit of the estate if the policy was purchased for the benefit of another person
"as collateral security for a loan or other accommodation." Id.
15. I.R.C. § 2042(2) (1986). Pursuant to section 2042, proceeds of life
insurance policies to which a decedent possessed any of the "incidents of ownership"
are included in the gross estate. Id. The section defines "incident of ownership"
to include reversionary interests exceeding five percent of the value of the policy
immediately preceding the death of the decedent. Id. Treasury Regulation 20421(c)(2) expands this definition by providing that the term refers to "the right of
the insured or his estate to the economic benefits of the policy." Treas. Reg. §
20.2042-1(c)(2) (as amended 1988). Under the regulation, the definition includes
the power to change the beneficiary, to surrender, cancel, assign or revoke the
policy, to obtain a loan against the surrender value of the policy and to pledge
the policy for a loan. Id.
Subsection (4) of the regulation provides that a decedent retains an "incident
of ownership" in a policy insuring his life, which is held in trust, if the decedent
"has the power (as trustee or otherwise) to change the beneficial ownership in the
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol54/iss3/4
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problems, these two avenues of inclusion have been fairly well litigated
and offer few surprises for the decedent's executor.
A third route for the estate taxation of life insurance is an indirect
one. Life insurance proceeds can be brought into the tax base as a part
of some asset which itself is included in the gross estate. Business interests,
like closely held corporations or partnerships, are illustrative. It is quite
common for these types of business entities to own life insurance on their
owners. 16 Proceeds of such a policy which are paid to the entity itself
17
upon an owner's death are factored into the valuation of the business.
These amounts are exposed to estate taxation to the extent the value of
the corresponding business interest, otherwise includable in the gross estate,
is increased.'" Indirect taxation of the proceeds becomes a direct inclusion
under section 2042 when one can show that ownership of the business
entity is equivalent to personal ownership of the life insurance policies. 19
Yet another route for gross estate inclusion of life insurance proceeds
is through one of the transfer sections, namely, I.R.C. sections 2035-2038.
It is quite unlikely, however, that either section 2036 or 2038 would cause
direct inclusion of the life insurance policy itself in the gross estate. An
outright transfer of a policy subject to the retention of a section 2036 or
section 2038 power would trigger section 2042 since the retained power
would be a taxable "incident of ownership." Thus, the need to go beyond
the primary inclusion section would be obviated.

policy or its proceeds, or the time or manner of enjoyment thereof, even though
the decedent has no beneficial interest in the trust." Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-1(c)(2)
(as amended 1988).
16. See generally R. GAEDEKE & D.

TooTELAN,

SMALL BusMEss

MANAGEMENT

178-79 (1980); C. WrLiAms & R. HEiNs, RISK MANAGEMENT AND INSURANcE 47374 (4th ed. 1981).
17. See Newell v. Commissioner, 66 F.2d 102 (7th Cir. 1933); Estate of
Huntsman v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 861 (1976); Rev. Rul. 82-85, 1982-1 C.B.
137.
18. See I.R.C. § 2033 (1982). It includes in the gross estate property owned
by the decedent at death. Business interests are such property and are, therefore,

includable. Thus, to the extent insurance proceeds increase the value of the property
included in the gross estate, they are taxed. See id.
19. Treasury Regulation 20.2042-1(c)(6) provides that where a corporation
owns and is the beneficiary of an insurance policy on the life of a sole or controlling
stockholder, the corporation's incidents of ownership are not attributed to the
decedent, and therefore, the proceeds are not directly includable in his gross estate.
Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-1(c)(6) (as amended in 1988). For this portion of the regulation
to apply, the decedent must have possessed, at the time of his death, more than
50 percent of the total combined voting power of the corporation. Id. However,

under Treasury Regulation section 20.2031-2(f), the proceeds of such policies shall
be considered in setting the value of the decedent's stock which is included in the
gross estate. Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-2(f) (as amended in 1988). See Estate of Levy
v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. 873 (1978); Rev. Rul. 82-141, 1982-2 C.B. 209.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1989
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These two transfer sections are necessary for inclusion purposes, however, if the policy is transferred to a third party or entity (usually a trust)
that possesses all of the incidents of ownership. If this occurs, the retained
control over the transferee-owner becomes crucial to gross estate inclusion.
In the more common trust setting, if a settlor retains too much control
over the trust, then the value of the trust, including any insurance proceeds,
will be includable in the decedent's gross estate under sections 2036,20
2038,21 or both.22 Here, however, it is the retained taxable control over
the ownership held by another coupled with the transfer of the policy, not
just the transfer itself, which creates the tax exposure. For either sections
2036 or 2038 to apply, both a transfer and the concomitant retention of
a taxable power are required. Additionally, to the extent an insured transfers
a policy and retains a reversionary interest therein, the interest retained
can constitute an incident of ownership under section 2042, 23 as well as a
possible taxable interest under section 2037.2 Again, to the extent I.R.C.

20. See Kasishke v. United States, 426 F.2d 429 (10th Cir. 1970); Estate of
Resch v. Commissioner, 20 T.C. 171 (1953) (applying I.R.C. § 811(c)(1)(B) (1939)current version at I.R.C. § 2036 (1982 & Supp. 1987)).
21. See Marshall v. United States, 338 F. Supp. 1321 (D.Md. 1971).
22. See Estate of Sulovich v. Commissioner, 587 F.2d 845 (6th Cir. 1978)
(holding that the decedent-settlor, by controlling the beneficiary's access to the
funds, had retained sufficient control over the trust savings accounts to require
their inclusion in the gross estate under I.R.C. §§ 2036, 2038 (1954)-current version
at I.R.C. §§ 2036, 2038 (1982 & Supp. 1987)); Estate of Craft v. Commissioner,
68 T.C. 249 (1977), aff'd, 608 F.2d 240 (5th Cir. 1979) (per curiam) (ruling that
the decedent-settlor's retention of the power to add beneficiaries and to change
beneficial interests in the trust was sufficient to cause the trust assets be taxed
under I.R.C. §§ 2036, 2038 (1954)-current version at I.R.C. §§ 2036, 2038 (1982
& Supp. 1987)); Estate of O'Connor v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 969 (1970) (ruling
that the settlor-trustee's retention of power to distribute trust income or to add it
to the principal rendered trust assets taxable under I.R.C. §§ 2036, 2038 (1954)current version at I.R.C. §§ 2036, 2038 (1982 & Supp. 1987)).
23. Treasury Regulation 20.2042-1(c)(3) defines "reversionary interest" to
include "a possibility that the policy or its proceeds may return to the decedent
or his estate and a possibility that the policy or its proceeds may become subject
to a power of disposition by him." Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-1(c)(3) (as amended in
1988). To determine whether the value of a reversionary interest exceeds five percent
of the value of the policy immediately before the death of the decedent, "there
must be specifically taken into consideration any incidents of ownership held by
others immediately before the decedent's death which would affect the value of
the reversionary interest. Id. If, at that time, some other person was the sole holder
of the power to obtain the cash surrender value of the policy or if the decedent
might receive the policy or its proceeds through the estate of another person, the
decedent would not have a reversionary interest in the policy in excess of five
percent.
24. I.R.C. § 2037(a)(2) (1988). Section 2037 is designed to force inclusion
in the gross estate -property which the decedent has transferred but has: (1) conditioned the recipient's enjoyment or possession of the property upon his surviving
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol54/iss3/4
the decedent, and (2) has retained a reversionary interest in the property where
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section 2037 must be relied upon for inclusion purposes, the transfer coupled
with the taxable retained interest is necessary.
Section 2035, however, triggers estate tax accounting purely upon the
transfer itself.Y There is no need for a corresponding retention of taxable
control. For this reason, it is the most potent of the indirect transfer tax
inclusion sections as applied to the gross estate inclusion of life insurance.
III.
A.

I.R.C. SECTON 2035
Historical Review

A historical review of section 2035 is a micro-analysis of one of the
major problems associated with administering the estate tax proper: tax
liability avoidance through tax base reduction. Although the provision has
undergone numerous specific changes since its inception, 26 from a broader
perspective one can identify three phases of its metamorphosis. Phase I
was a subjective inclusion era, Phase II a strict inclusion era, and Phase
III, generally, an exclusion era. Despite its historical interest 27-indeed, the
common reference to the section 2035 transfers as "gifts in contemplation
of death" sprang from its early versions 2 -Phase I and its presumption

the reversion's value exceeds five percent of the transferred property's value. I.R.C.
§ 2037(a)(1)-(2) (1986).
Treasury Regulation 20.2037-1(c)(2) defines "reversionary interest" to include
"a possibility that property transferred by the decedent may return to him or his
estate and a possibility that property transferred by the decedent may become
subject to a power of disposition by him." Treas. Reg. § 20.2037-1(c)(2) (as amended
in 1988). The term includes "an interest arising either by the express terms of the
instrument of transfer or by operation of law," but does not include rights to
income only nor the "possibility that the decedent during his lifetime might have
received back an interest in transferred property by inheritance through the estate
of another person." Id.
25. See, e.g., Estate of Porter v. Commissioner, 442 F.2d 915 (1st Cir.
1971).
26. The original version first appeared in Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463, §
202(b), 39 Stat. 756.
27. For a brief history of the section, see C. LowNDEs, R. KRAMR & J.
McCoRD, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GwT TAXES 68-71 (3d ed. 1974); Comment, Transfers
in Contemplation of Death-The Golden Anniversary of Chaos, 11 VILL. L. REv.
814 (1966).
28. See, e.g., Revenue Act of 1916, supra note 26. Section 202(b) of the
Revenue Act of 1916 provided:
[T]hat the value of the gross estate of the decedent shall be determined
by including the value at the time of his death of all property, real or
personal, tangible or intangible, wherever situated:
(b) To the extent of any interest therein of which the decedent has
at any time made a transfer, or with respect to Which he has created a
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1989
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of includability for certain gifts 29 currently is of little import. Phase II,
however, has retained its vitality for certain transfers of life insurance and,
consequently, merits review.
When the estate and gift tax structure was revamped by the Tax Reform
Act of 1976,30 section 2035 underwent a sweeping change which ushered

in Phase II.31 Taxpayers no longer have the opportunity to raise defenses2
against application of the section to overcome the statutory presumption?

trust, in contemplation of ... death .... Any transfer of a material
part of his property in the nature of a final disposition or distribution
thereof, made by the decedent within two years prior to his death without
such consideration, shall, unless shown to the contrary, be deemed to have
been made in contemplation of death within the meaning of this title....
Id. (emphasis added).
29. The original "contemplation of death" provision presumed transfers of
"material parts of [decedent's] property" occurring within two years of death to
have been made in contemplation of death unless there was a showing to the
contrary. See id. The donor-decedent's motivation for making the gift was the
pivotal test for includability. United States v. Wells, 283 U.S. 102, 115-19 (1931).
Each case warranted a sui generis review. Herbert Kahn v. Commissioner, 4 B.T.A.
1289 (1926). The burden was clearly on the estate to overcome the presumption.
See Wickwire v. Reinecke, 275 U.S. 101, 105 (1927).
In an effort to thwart a perceived manipulation of the statute resulting in a
loss of revenue and to eliminate unfair results, Congress replaced the rebuttable
presumption with an irrebutable presumption for certain gifts. See Revenue Act
of 1926, ch. 27, § 302(c), 44 Stat. 9; H.R. 1, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. (1925). Shortly
after its enactment, the provision was ruled unconstitutional. Heiner v. Donnan,
285 U.S. 312 (1932). Congress then returned to the two year rebuttable presumption.
Revenue Act of 1932, ch. 20, § 803(a), 47 Stat. 169 (1932). Phase I ended with
the establishment of a rebuttable presumption that all transfers made within three
years of death were made in contemplation of death and, therefore, were part of
the decedents' gross estate. Revenue Act of 1950, ch. 994, § 501, 64 Stat. 906.
30. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 172 [hereinafter
TRA 1976],
31. Section 2001(d)(1) of TRA 1976 amended section 2035 of the Internal
Revenue Code to provide in pertinent part:
Adjustments for gifts made within 3 years of decedent's death
(a) Inclusion of gifts made by decedent. Except as provided in subsection (b), the value of the gross estate shall include the value of all
property to the extent of any interest therein of which the decedent has
at any time made a transfer, by trust or otherwise, during the 3-year
period ending on the date of the decedent's death.
I.R.C. § 2035(a) (1976).

The act also provided an exception for small gifts and added the "subsection
(c) gross-up" rule for forcing an estate tax accounting for gift taxes paid within
three years of the donor-decedent's death. See TRA 1976, supra note 30.
32. In Phase I, executors often successfully rebutted the statutory presumption
and were able to exclude the value of the property transferred within three years
of the decedent's death from estate taxation. The cases are legion in number and
any attempt to cite them all would be pointless. For citations to taxpayer victories
in proving different motives, see C. LowND s, R. KRAIMR & J. McCoRaD, supra
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol54/iss3/4
note 27, §§ 5.5-5.12.
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Instead, all transfers made within three years of death were included in

the gross estate. The new rule did not create an uproar comparable to
that accompanying the original "contemplation of death" statute33 because
of the way in which the revised section interacted with the new transfer
tax structure that had been put into place.3 4 The new uniform transfer tax

system was designed to treat inter vivos and testamentary transfers substantially the same for tax purposes. 35 Even though some benefits for inter
vivos gifts survived, 36 the overall effect of the system was to treat all
transfers, whenever made, equally. In theory, therefore, it made little
difference whether the transfer was made part of the overall transfer tax
base as a gift or as part of the gross estate.
A major exception to the equal treatment of transfer rule wa§ the
value of the property ultimately subjected to the tax. By including transfers
made within three years of death in the estate tax base as part of the
gross estate, all post-transfer appreciation was captured and added to the
tax base. 37 Ordinarily, the Internal Revenue Code would not have exposed

33. The original "contemplation of death" provision, Revenue Act of 1916,
ch. 463, § 202(b), 39 Stat. 756, was eventually challenged on constitutional grounds
but found valid. See Milliken v. United States, 283 U.S. 15 (1931).
34. TRA 1976 integrated the estate and gift taxes into a single unified transfer
tax system with a common rate schedule. See I.R.C. § 2001(c) (1976). See also
I.R.C. § 2502(a) (1976) (directing the use of the schedule for gift tax computations).
In addition, TRA 1976 created a unified credit. See I.R.C. §§ 2010, 2505 (1976).
Thus, in theory it made little difference whether the transfer was taxed as a gift
or as part of the gross estate. See infra note 36 for a different conclusion. For
a discussion of the constitutionality of the automatic inclusion rule, see Peat, The
Constitutionality of New Section 2035: Is There Any Room for Doubt?, 33 TAX
L. REv. 287 (1978); Note, 19 B.C.L. REv. 577, 580-84 (1978).
35. See R. STEPHENS, G. MAxFiELD & S. LIND, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GuT
TAXATION § 1.02(1) (5th ed. 1983).
36. Only taxable gifts, not otherwise included in the gross estate, were brought
back into the tentative estate tax base. Thus, transfers excluded from gift tax
accounting entirely, such as annual gifts of $10,000 or less, were also excused from
the final transfer tax accounting. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 2503(b) (1988). Also, the posttransfer appreciation of and income from gifts escape estate taxation since taxable
gifts are included in the tentative estate tax base at their value on the date the
gift was made. See I.R.C. § 2001(b)(1)(B) (1988). Finally, to the extent a gift
generates a gift tax liability which is not recaptured under section 2035(c), one can
capture an additional overall transfer tax savings. For a full discussion of transfer
tax benefits associated with gift giving, see Morris, The Tax Posture of Gifts in
Estate Planning: Dinosaur or Dynasty?, 64 NEB. L. REv. 25, 51-55 (1985).
37. This is the result of the section 2031 date of death valuation, or if
operative, section 2032 alternate valuation estate tax accounting versus the date of
gift accounting for taxable gifts not otherwise made a part of the gross estate.
See infra note 62 for discussion of I.R.C. § 2032 (1982 & Supp. 1987).
It is worth noting that when a decline in value occurs, the system operates
in reverse. This result is a logical consequence of looking to the date of death
values instead of the date of gift values for estate tax inclusion purposes. For
example, if the gift property had a date of gift value of $4x and a date of death
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1989
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this growth to taxation. A gift not otherwise included in the gross estate
became part of the estate tax base at its gift tax value. 8
Despite its apparent simplicity, Phase II was not without its interpretative difficulties. Congress carved out a notable exception to the strict

inclusion rule for gifts that did not require a concomitant filing of a gift

tax return. 39 In practical terms, gifts equal to, or under, the annual exclusion

amount (then $3,000, now $10,000) 40 did not have to be pulled back into
the gross estate under section 2035. Indeed, such gifts were never subjected
to a transfer tax at all. 4' This rule applied regardless of the gifted property's
value at the time of the donor's death.
Taxpayers sought to use the "small gift" exception to exclude the full
annual exclusion amount or some appropriately computed percent of the
gift's date of death value for all transfers made within three years of death.
They ultimately discovered that the section excused only transfers at or
below the annual exclusion amount at the time of the gift. 42 Life insurance
policies, assets with usually small gift tax values that blossomed into large
estate tax amounts were, nevertheless, easily fit into the exception. Subsequently, Congress closed the escape hatch by specifically excluding gifts
of life insurance from the operation of the "small gift" exception.4 3 Thus,
Phase II moved on, with little difficulty, through its relatively short-lived
existence.
When Congress reexamined the estate tax in 1981," it drastically changed

value of $3x, only the $3x value is includable in the tentative tax base, notwithstanding the fact that the donor-decedent transferred $4x of 'value. One might
recover any gift tax paid on the higher amount through the mechanics of the estate

tax computation. See I.R.C. § 2001(b)(2) (1988).
38. See I.R.C. § 2001(b)(2) (1988).
39.

I.R.C. § 2035(b)(1) (1954), as amended by TRA 1976, supra note 30,

§ 2001(a)(5).
40. See I.R.C. § 2503(b) (1982 & Supp. 1987). Prior to 1982, the annual
exclusion amount was $3,000. See I.R.C. § 2503(b) (1954), as amended by TRA
1976, supra note 30.
41. Not only did these transfers escape gift taxation, but they escaped estate

taxation as well. Other inter vivos transfers were added to the tentative estate tax
base as adjusted taxable gifts. These transfers by definition were not taxable gifts

and, therefore, not adjusted taxable gifts. See I.R.C. §§ 2503(a), 2001(b)(2) (1982
& Supp. 1987). Consequently, they never generated any adverse estate tax exposure.
42. See Estate of Ceppi v. Commissioner, 698 F.2d 17 (1st Cir.), cert. denied,
462 U.S. 1120 (1983).
43. See Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 702(f)(1), 92 Stat.
2930. The Revenue Act of 1978 amended section 2035(b)(2) by adding the following
sentence: "Paragraph (2) shall not apply to any transfer with respect to a life
insurance policy." Id.
44. Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, 95 Stat. 172
(1981) [hereinafter ERTA 1981] significantly changed the application of the estate
and gift taxes by, inter alia, increasing the unified credit and restricting the marital
deduction. For a general discussion of the impact of ERTA, see PRacrciNo LAw
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol54/iss3/4
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the role of section 2035. 41 At that time, Congress took the exact opposite
tack it had taken a few years earlier and decided that transfers made within
three years of death, except in some limited instances, 46 should not be

45. See ERTA 1981, supra note 44, §§ 403(b)(3)(B), 424(a). Sections 403(b)(3)(B)
and 424(a) changed section 2035 to read as follows:
(a) Inclusion of gifts made by decedent.-Except as provided in subsection (b), the value of the gross estate shall include the value of all
property to the extent of any interest therein of which the decedent has
at any time made a transfer, by trust or otherwise, during the 3-year
period ending on the date of the decedent's death.
(b) Exceptions.-Subsection (a) shall not apply (1) to any bona fide sale for an adequate and full consideration
for money or money's worth, and
(2) to any gift to a donee made during a calendar year if the
decedent was not required by section 6019 (other than by reason of section
6019(a)(2)) to file any gift tax return for such year with respect to gifts
to such donee. Paragraph (2) shall not apply to any transfer with respect
to a life insurance policy.
(c) Inclusion of gift tax on certain gifts made during 3 years before
decedent's death. - The amount of the gross estate (determined without
regard to this subsection) shall be increased by the amount of any tax
paid under chapter 12 by the decedent or his estate on any gift made by
the decedent or his spouse after December 31, 1976, and during the 3year period ending on the date of the decedent's death.
(d) Decedents dying after 1981. (1) In general.-Except as otherwise provided in this subsection,
subsection (a) shall not apply to the estate of a decedent dying after
December 31, 1981.
(2) Exceptions for certain transfers-paragraph (1) of this subsection and paragraph (2) of subsection (b) shall not apply to a transfer of
an interest in property which is included in the value of the gross estate
under section 2036, 2037, 2038, or 2042 would have been included under
any of such sections if such interest had been retained by the decedent.
(3) 3-year rule retained for certain purposes.-Paragraph (1) shall
not apply for purposes of (A) section 303(b) (relating to distributions in redemption of
stock to pay death taxes),

(B)section 2032A (relating to special valuation of certain farm,
etc., real property),
(C) section 6166 (relating to extension of time for payment of
estate tax where estate consists largely of interest in closely held business),
and
(D) subchapter C of chapter 64 (relating to lien for taxes).
Id. Subsequently, powers of appointment (covered by section 2041) were eliminated from subsection (d)(2) treatment. Technical Corrections Act of 1982, Pub.
L. No. 97-488, § 104(d)(2)(B), 96 Stat. 2635.
46. Section 2035(d)(2), I.R.C. § 2035(d)(2) (1981), serves a dual function.
It provides that certain transfers which are includable in the gross estate under
other transfer sections are not excused from taxation under subsection (d)(1) because
they were made within three years of death. Id. Subsection (d)(2) also prevents
transfers of otherwise taxable interests, which occur within the proscribed period,
from escaping inclusion in the gross estate.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1989
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pulled back into the gross estate.47 In general, fully completed gifts were
to be added to the estate tax base in the normal course of tax accounting
at their gift tax values and not be taxed through the gross estate with the
potential for higher valuation, 48 Consequently, in the current Phase III
exclusion era of section 2035, the problems of the past phases seem to
have "gone by the boards." Unfortunately, some problems still linger, and
a significant one concerns life insurance.
Section 2035 still requires gross estate inclusion for any life insurance
policy transferred within three years of death if the policy would have
been included in the gross estate under section 2042 had the decedent not
made the transfer. 49 The statute provides for this result in a rather circumlocutory way. The Phase II inclusion provision-subsection (a) 50-is
generally made inapplicable by the Phase III exclusion provision-subsection
(d)(l).s1 But, subsection (d)(2)5 2 specifically excepts application of the (d)(1)
general rule for transfers of property interests which would have been
included under, inter alia,53 section 2042 had the taxpayers retained the
interest until death. Moreover, once subsection (a) applies, a transfer of
life insurance made within three years of death becomes includable in the
gross estate regardless of its gift value date because the "small gift"
exception remains inapplicable to life insurance transfers. Even if the
exception could be applied, subsection (d)(2) specifically excepts the exception.5 4 All in all, this is a very convoluted method for ensuring that
the full proceeds, not just the gift tax value of life insurance, are subjected
to transfer estate taxation if the policy, or an interest therein, is transferred
within three years of death by the insured-decedent.

47. See ERTA 1981, supra note 44, § 424(a). Notwithstanding the benefit
accorded completed gifts themselves, section 2035(c), which forces the recapture of
any gift tax paid on gifts made within three years of death, remained unchanged.
48. See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
impact of estate tax versus gift tax valuation for transfer tax purposes.
49. See I.R.C. § 2035(d)(2) (1982 & Supp. 1987). Section 2035(d)(2) specifically refers to interests taxable under section 2042, the life insurance inclusion
section.
50. I.R.C. § 2035(a) (Supp. 1987). Section 2035(a) was never repealed.
Instead, section 2035(d)(1) makes it inapplicable to the estates of decedent's dying
after December 31, 1981, except for certain interests enumerated in subsection (d)(2).

See I.R.C. § 2035(d)(1) (1981). See supra note 45.
51. I.R.C. § 2035(d)(1) (1981). See supra note 45.
52.

Id. § 2035(d)(2) (1981).

53. Section 2035(d)(2), I.R.C. § 2035(d)(2) (1981), also included transfers of
interests otherwise includable under sections 2036, 2037 and 2038, I.R.C. §§ 20362038 (1982 & Supp. 1987). 'See id. § 2035(d)(2). Transfers of interests taxable under
section 2041 were originally included in this group, but were subsequently excused
from the application of section 2035(d)(2). See id.
54. I.R.C. § 2035(d)(2) (1981). The statutory direction is clear; any interest
that would be included in the gross estate under section 2042 is made subject to
section 2035(a) by section 2035(d)(2).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol54/iss3/4
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The result, if not the route, is clear. "Transfers" of certain "interests"
are given Phase II inclusion treatment in the Phase III exclusion era. Still,
the statute leaves some questions unanswered. Specifically, what are "transfers" and "interests" for purposes of the section? And, are or should

constructive transfers of life insurance be subject to the non-exclusionary
rule that an otherwise "plain reading"" of the statute would indicate, as
held by Leder?

B. Life Insurance Transfers: Some Specifics
It was well settled that proceeds from a life insurance policy transferred
by a decedent prior to his death were excludable from the gross estate.16
Nevertheless, it was essential that the decedent not retain any "incident
57
of ownership" in the policy in order to avoid adverse estate tax exposure.
But, as already discussed, the government could seek inclusion of proceeds
of transferred life insurance policies under section 2035. Given its legislative
purpose' and the nature of the asset, the application of the section to
gifts of life insurance, surprisingly, did not generate the number of gross
estate inclusions during Phase I as one might have expected.59
Throughout most of its history, section 2035 only applied to transfers
made within a certain time period prior to the transferor's death. 60 With
hindsight, this requirement was easily determined mechanically. The vexing

55. The Leder court stated:
The plain language of section 2035(d)(2) requires as a threshold issue that
there be an interest in property under the terms of the sections it lists
(e.g., sec. 2042). It requires that the decedent transfer an interest in property
included in the gross estate or an interest that would have been included
if the decedent had retained such an interest. The decedent must have
had at some time such an interest in property, or else there is nothing
for him to retain or transfer and section 2035(d)(2) cannot apply.
89 T.C. 235, 239 (1987).
56. Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-1(c) (1988).
57. I.R.C. § 2042 will force inclusion of insurance proceeds even if the
decedent was possessed of only one incident of ownership. Sec. Reg. § 20.2042-

I(C). Thus, it is essential that all such incidents be transferred away prior to death
in order to avoid subjecting the proceeds to estate taxation.
58. The provision was always viewed as a protection against estate tax base
dissipation through end-of-life gift-giving. As noted by the Supreme Court in Milliken
v. United States, 283 U.S. 15, 23 (1931), "Underlying the present statute is the
policy of taxing such gifts equally with testamentary dispositions, for which they
may be substituted, and the prevention of the evasion of estate taxes by gifts made
before, but in contemplation of, death." Id. (emphasis added).
59. Pavenstedt, The Limitation of Taxation of Transfers in Contemplation
of Death by the Revenue Act 1950, 49 MIcH. L. Rv. 839, 840-41 (1951).
60. Early versions of the.provision permitted scrutiny of all gifts, whenever
made, for "contemplation of death" purposes. In the final stage of Phase I, in
all of Phase II and presently in Phase III, however, the provision looks only to
gifts made within three years of donor's death. See supra notes 28 and 29.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1989
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issues were whether a transfer had been made at all, and if so, of what?
Other times, even after a taxable transfer was found, the section lent itself
to different interpretations of the proper value for inclusion in the gross
estate. A review of these two issues and how they interrelate with the basic
statutory requirements for the section will bring the current problems
associated with transferring life insurance and including it under section
2035 into better focus.
Looking at the valuation problem first, section 2035, like all estate tax
inclusion sections, is keyed to section 2031, the gross estate definition
section.61 The general rule is that the gross estate is valued at the decedent's
date of death. 62 When dealing with a taxable section 2035 transfer, the
question becomes what is to be valued at the time of death-the specific
asset itself that was transferred or the quantum of interests resulting from
the transfer?
If a donee receives property and retains it up until the decedent's
death, it is quite simple to posit that the asset's date of death value, itself,
is includable in the gross estate if section 2035 applies. On the other hand,
what if the donee sells the gifted property and reinvests the proceeds in
another asset? Now what is the proper value captured by section 2035?
Is it the new asset's date of death value, or should one look back to the
original asset transferred by the donor-decedent and value it at the donor's
death, even though it is no longer owned by the donee? The government,
through its regulations,63 has .long insisted that one must look to the thing
itself that was transferred and vqlue it as of the decedent's death. This
position was sustained i4 Humphrey's Estate v. Commissioner.4 There,
after specifically referring to the Treasury Regulations, the court posited
that the purpose of the s.tatutory provision was to reach "the same tax
result as if the decedent had kept [the transferred property] till [sic] he
died instead of transferring it.'"6s Thus, the court concluded that the asset
itself was to be valued at the date of death irrespective of any changes

61. Section 2031, I.R.C. § 2031 (1982), defines the gross estate as follows:
"(a) General.-The value of the gross estate of the decedent shall be determined
by including to the extent provided for in this part, the value at the time of his
death of all property, real or personal, tangible or intangible, wherever situated."
62. Id. Section 2032, I.R:C. § 2032 (1982 & Supp. 1987), provides an elective

alternative valuation rule. It is designed to prevent unfair results which may arise

from forcing a tax accounting based upon a "one-day freeze" of assets. Thus,
executors may choose date of death values or the alternate valuation values (sale
or disposition values within six months of death and, for assets not disposed of,

their value at six months fom death). Application of the provision would never

change'the valuation of cash, and, thus, life insurance proceeds payable upon the
decedent's death are unaffected. Id.
63. See Treas. Reg. 105 § 81.15 (19xx) (interpreting I.R.C. § 811 (1939)).
64. 162 F.2d 1 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 817 (1947).

65. Id. at 2.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol54/iss3/4
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in its form or subsequent investment that may have occurred from the
time of gift to the time of death.
Humphrey's Estate involved a cash gift which, after being invested by
the donee, resulted in a partial loss of capital at the time of the donor's
death. In Revenue Ruling 72-282,6 the donee received stock, subsequently
sold it, and used the proceeds utilized to procure a different investment.
Applying the rationale and language of Humphrey's Estate,67 the ruling
concluded that the original stock's date of death value was the appropriate
includable amount. The ruling specifically mioted that any increase (and
implicitly, decrease) in value resulting from the donee's actions is not to
be taken into account for the purposes of valuing section 2035 interests. 8
With life insurance, the application of an apparently easy "date of
death" valuation rule has a significant impact on estate taxation. Life

insurance, unlike most other assets, is designed to have its full value realized
at death and tends to be of only minimal value during life.6 9 Therefore,
valuing it at the transferor-insured's death provides maximum tax exposure
to the estate. Perhaps ensuring full value taxation is the very reason that
70
section 2035 includes a special rule for transfers of life insurance.
Taxpayers have met with little success in their efforts to reduce the
estate tax valuations of life insurance transfers. When less than full value

of the policy proceeds has been incltded, the results flowed from the
favorable resolution of "donee consideration"-type claims raised by estates
rather than from pure valuation arguments. Estate of Haas71 and Estate
of Silverman v. Commissioner 2 are illustrative.
In Haas, the decedent died shortly after having taken actions deemed
a constructive transfer of life instiiance within tlie purview of section 2035.
To determine the proper amount to be included in the gross estate, the
court first looked to the relevant local community property law. After
doing so, it determined that a constructive transfer was paid for from
community property funds, one-half of which was attributable to each
spouse. The court concluded that since only one-half of the funds belonged

66. Rev. Rul. 72-282, 1972-1 C.B. 306.
67. The revenue ruling stated, "Where the donee has dissipated the property
so that there is nothing left as of the date of the transferor's death, the amount
includable is not what actually exists but rather the present value of the property
originally transferred." Id. at 307 (citing Humphrey's Estate, 162 F.2d at 2).
68. Id.
69. Although traditionally thig was the case, a variety of new insurance
products have recently emerged which are designed' to provide benefits while the
owner is still alive. These producis u'sualI' dele'id oi the tax-free internal, growth
to provide benefits accorded life insurance policies. The tax treatment of these
products has received criticism, and stricter regulation is imposed.
70. See I.R.C. § 2035(b) (1982).
71. 51 T.C.M. (CCH) 453 (1986).
72. 521 F.2d 574 (2d Cir. 1975).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1989
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to the decedent, he could have transferred only a corresponding fraction
of the policy. The balance of the policy was the surviving spouse's property
from the outset of the transaction, and, therefore, could not be viewed
as a transfer by the decedent to her. Since only one-half of the policy
was transferred by the decedent, only one-half of the proceeds were properly
73
included in his gross estate.
In Silverman, the decedent transferred insurance to his children who
paid all of the post-transfers to support the policy from their own funds.
The transfer was made within three years of the decedent's death, and the
government sought inclusion of the policy proceeds in the decedent's gross
estate under section 2035. The estate contended that the beneficiaries should
be credited with their contributions toward the maintenance of the policy
and that only the portion of the proceeds attributable to the decedent's
premium payments should be included in the gross estate. The court
concurred with the taxpayer analogizing the situation to any other one in
which contributions made by donees to property subsequently included in
the donor's gross estate ought to be credited to the donees and not be
74
taxed in the estate. Thus, by applying the section 2035 contribution rule,
the court excluded a percentage of the proceeds attributable to the donees'
premium payments from the gross estate. 7"
In Silverman, the premiums paid by the decedent within three years
of death on the policies included in the gross estate were not considered
separate section 2035 transfers.7 6 To include both the premiums and the
corresponding proceeds gives the appearance of taxing the same transfer

twice. Generally, however, if a policy is transferred beyond the statutorily
proscribed period, the proceeds themselves are not capturable as a section
2035 asset, but any premium payments made within the measuring period
are includable in the gross estate under section 2035.7 One might query
why, when the donee pays premiums, an aliquot share of the proceeds are
attributable to any such payments, but when the donor makes premium
payments on a policy transferred beyond the statutory period, the only
assets captured by section 2035 are the actual premiums paid?

73. Haas, 51 T.C.M. (CCH) at 455 (1986).
74. See R. STEPHENs, G. MAxPmLD & S. LIND, supra note 35, at § 4.07(2)(d);
Treas. Reg. § 20.2035-1(e) (1988).
75. Silverman, 521 F.2d at 577-78.
76. Id. at 576.
77. Safeguards exist against multiple taxation of the same transfer. Section
2012 allows a credit for gift taxes paid on gifts made after 1977 which are included
in the gross estate under one of the estate tax sections. I.R.C. § 2012 (1982).
Section 2001(b) allows a similar result for all gifts made after December 31, 1976.
I.R.C. § 2001(b) (Supp. 1987). The credit for these latter transfers is necessary
because all taxable gifts not made part of the gross estate are nonetheless added
to the tentative estate tax base.
78. See, e.g., Bintliff v. United States, 462 F.2d 403 (5th Cir. 1972); Estate
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol54/iss3/4
of Coleman, 52 T.C. 921 (1969).
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Although valuation problems can usually be solved without much difficulty even when life insurance proceeds are concerned, the issue of whether
or not a transfer has been made does not always lend itself to such easy
resolution. In many cases, it is easy to identify the transfer necessary for
the purposes of section 2035. Generally, any time an already existing policy
is given to another, the transfer will be apparent. Taxpayers have attempted,
however, to avoid "transferring" the policy by utilizing a simple procedure.
The policy is actually taken out by the beneficiary, and the premiums to
support the policy are furnished, either directly or indirectly, by the decedent
during his or her life. One could argue then that 1) section 2042 is
inapplicable because the decedent did not possess any incidents of ownership
in the policy at death, and 2) section 2035 is inapplicable for want of a
transfer, The government, quick to realize the ease with which a taxpayer

could avoid the application of the statute," focused attention on the effect
of the decedent's application for insurance coupled with the furnishing of
premium payments, and concluded that those acts taken together constituted
a transfer. Ultimately, the courts were quite hospitable to the government's
argument,80 and, by recognizing these "constructive transfers," paved the
way for estate taxation of these transactions, but only in Phases I and II.
During these two phases, only a transfer of some unidentified or nonspecific interest in the property was required in order for section 2035 or
one of its predecessors to apply. 81 Phase III, however, requires the transfer
of an interest otherwise taxable under section 2042(a) before life insurance
can be brought into the gross estate under the authority of section 2035.82
The current section 2035-life insurance transfer embroglio centers on
whether constructive transfers of policies are still susceptible to gross estate
inclusion. The more narrow question is exactly what, if anything, has the
decedent transferred when the policy is applied for and always owned by
another. If it can be shown that the decedent either 1) has not made a
transfer of a verbotten interest in the policy, or 2) possessed no incidents
of ownership in the policy at his death, then there is no basis for including
any of the proceeds in the gross estate. 83 That is the teaching of Leder.
If, however, the decedent transferred an otherwise "taxable interest in the
policy" (whatever this phrase is ultimately defined to mean) within the
three year period preceding death, then inclusion of the proceeds under

79. See infra notes 84, 89-92 and accompanying text.
80. After some early judicial hostility (see infra notes 93-96, 99-110 and
accompanying text), the courts eventually approved this analysis and adopted the
"constructive transfer" doctrine. See, infra notes 112-30 and accompanying text.
81. See Estate of Porter, 442 F.2d 915 (1st Cir. 1971). This case is discussed
infra notes 158-61 and accompanying text.
82. See I.R.C. § 2035(d)(2) (1988).
83. See supra notes 13-25 and accompanying text.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1989
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section 2035 seems warranted. In these instances, there is direct authority
for inclusion under section 2035(d)(2), which carves out specific exceptions
to the rule excluding transfers made within three years of death from the
gross estate.
It is undisputed that if a decedent had any "section 2042(a) interest"
in the policy and transferred it away within three years of death, the
proceeds of the life insurance policy would be includable in the gross estate.
But, if the decedent never had such an interest in the policy, it follows
there was no "interest" that could have been given away. Therefore, the
"section 2035(d)(2)" rule would not apply. So goes the argument for
excluding policies taken out by another on the life of the premium-paying
deceased-insured. An argument accepted by the Leder court, without going
to the perhaps more pressing underlying questions, is whether an "incident
of ownership" is an interest in the policy.
What is the wisdom of adopting this interpretation of the tax rule?
Did Congress really intend to leave such an easily accessible escape hatch?
Is the constructive transfer theory sufficiently elastic to include an "imputed
interest" corollary? The analysis starts innocently enough, but quickly moves
into the treacherous waters of trying to determine the underlying nature
of "transfers" themselves for estate and gift tax purposes.
C. The Constructive Transfer Doctrine
If a decedent transferred money to a donee, proper application of
section 2035 would require inclusion of only that dollar amount in the
decedent's gross estate, irrespective of what the donee subsequently did
with the money. Merely because a donee applied the funds to the purchase
of an insurance policy on the donor's life, instead of some other asset,
should ordinarily leave the rule unaltered. The government was unhappy
with the result. Specifically, if the donee used the gifted money to support
an insurance policy on the donor-decedent, payable at the latter's death,
the government thought that the corresponding proceeds, not just the value
of the premium payments themselves made within the statutorily proscribed
period, ought to be captured by section 2035. This theory began a long,
hard fought battle over the proper application of the "contemplation of
death" section to life insurance transfers.
The first meaningful skirmishes came in Revenue Ruling 67-46384 and
a trio of subsequent cases. All were reported within a relatively small time
of each other and involved Phase I-type section 2035 transfers. Additionally,
each relied upon Chase National Bank v. United States5 as authority for
finding the requisite transfer for application of section 2035. Thus, Chase
serves as a logical first step in tracing the trail up to Leder.

84. Rev. Rul. 67-463, 1967-2 C.B. 327.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol54/iss3/4
85. 278 U.S. 327 (1929).
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In Chase, the decedent purchased insurance policies reserving the right
to change the beneficiary designation. The government sought to include
the policy proceeds in the gross estate pursuant to an early Phase I version
of section 2035. The decedent's estate challenged the constitutionality of
the provision and of the tax itself and argued in the alternative that the

decedent had not made a transfer to which the tax could attach. After
dismissing the constitutional issues raised by the estate, 6 the Court similarly
disposed of the taxpayer's other claim by finding that there was a "transfer"
to which the tax could attach. s7 The critical aspect of Chase is how it

conceptualized "transfer" for transfer tax purposes. The Court recognized
that "transfer" is not limited to a direct movement of a property right
from donor to donee, but includes indirect transfers whereby the donor

is the source of a transaction that results in the donee's receipt of a
benefit. 8 This broad view of "transfer"

is the key that opens the door

for "constructive transfers" to enter the section 2035 field of activity.

86. The taxpayer argued that the tax was "a direct tax on property void
because not apportioned," or alternatively unconstitutional because the arbitrary
and capricious method of collection violated the 5th Amendment. Id. at 333-34.
The Court had little difficulty in dismissing these claims and upholding the statute
as a tax on the privilege of transferring property rather than on the property itself.
Id. at 334.
87. Chase, 278 U.S. at 335, 338.
88. Id. at 337-38. Regarding this point, the Court stated:
Obviously the word "transfer" in the statute, or the privilege which may
constitutionally be taxed, cannot be taken in such a restricted sense as to
refer only to the passing of particular items of property directly from the
decedent to the transferee. It must, we think, at least include the transfer
of property procured through expenditures by the decedent with the purpose, effected at his death, of having it pass to another. Section 402(c)
taxes transfers made in contemplation of death. It would not, we assume,
be seriously argued that its provisions could be evaded by the purchase
by a decedent from a third person of property, a savings bank book for
example, and its delivery by the seller directly to the intended beneficiary

on the purchaser's death, or that the measure of the tax would be the
cost and not the value or proceeds at the time of death.
The plaintiff points to no requirement, constitutional or statutory,
that the termination of the power of disposition of property by death
whereby the transfer of property is completed, which we have said is here
the subject of the tax, must be preceded by a transfer directly from the
decedent to the recipient of his bounty, of the property subject to the
power. And we see no necessity to debate the question whether the policies
themselves were so transferred, for we think the power to tax the privilege
of transfer at death cannot be controlled by the mere choice of the
formalities which may attend the donor's bestowal of benefits on another
at death, or of the particular methods by which his purpose is effected,
so long as he retains control over those benefits with power to direct their
future enjoyment until his death ....

Id. at 337-38.
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The government relied heavily on Chase in promulgating Revenue Ruling
67-463.19 The ruling addressed the specific issue of whether any portion
of the proceeds of an insurance policy transferred by the decedent more
than three years prior to his death were includable in his gross estate
merely because he continued to make the premium payments on the policy
up until his death. The ruling also examined the situation when a spouse
was the original applicant for and owner of the policy, but all premium
payments were made by the insured-decedent up until his deathY" The
ruling distinguished a gift of cash from a gift of a premium payment
proper, analogizing the latter to a gift of specific property. The ruling
stated, "[U]nlike the unrestricted gift of money, a premium payment is a
gift of insurance protection, a transfer of an interest in the policy which
is transmitted at death into the proceeds of the policy." 9' Since section
2035 requires the value of the actual property transferred to be included
in the gross estate, the ruling concluded that the proceeds corresponding
to the property interest in the policy that was transferred, and not the
dollars used to pay the premium, were properly subject to estate tax
exposure. Accordingly, the proportion of the proceeds attributable to the
premium payments made in contemplation of death, as it bears to the
total premium payments made to support the policy from its inception,
are properly includable in the gross estate.
The ruling also summarily concluded, without any amplification, that
the same tax consequences result even though someone other than the
insured had originally applied for the policy.92 The message was clear;
proper application of Chase makes each premium payment a transfer of
a corresponding interest in the insurance policy itself.
The revenue ruling received a sharp rebuke in Gorman v. United States,93
a case involving the acquisition of an insurance policy in the name of the
insured by another within three years of the insured's death. The court
criticized the ruling's attempt to apply a variation of the "premium payment" test to a section 2035 transfer. 94 The "premium payment" test was
a method for taxing life insurance under section 2042, by then long since
replaced by the "incidents of ownership" test. 95 In giving Chase an extremely
narrow reading, 96 the court held that when a premium is paid by someone
for a policy on the life of another without any obligation to do so, only

89. See Rev. Rul. 67-463, 1967-2 C.B. 328.
90. Id. at 329.
91. Id. at 328 (emphasis added).
92. Id. at 230.
93. 288 F. Supp. 225 (E.D. Mich. 1968).
94. Id. at 225.
95. Id.
96. The court concluded that Chase was essentially a case concerning the
constitutionality of the tax statute itself and not one which "considered the relationship of premiums with proceeds." Id. at 228-29.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol54/iss3/4
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the value of the premium itself is the subject of the transfer. In turn, only
the dollar value of the premium, and not a corresponding portion of the
proceeds, is capturable by section 2035.
On facts similar to Gorman, the district court in First National Bank
of Midland v. United States97 included a portion of an insurance policy's
proceeds in the decedent's gross estate based upon premiums made in
contemplation of death. 98 Offering no rationale of its own, the court merely
cited Revenue Ruling 67-463 as its authority for the rule that premiums
paid in contemplation of death require an estate tax accounting for an
aliquot share of proceeds attributable to those premiums.
The third case, Estate of Coleman v. Commissioner," became the most
notable of the group. In Coleman, the decedent's children purchased a life
insurance policy on the decedent's life. The record indicates that the children
owned the policy from its inception and that the decedent never possessed
nor transferred any of the incidents of ownership in it. The decedent,
however, made all of the premium payments on the policy. The parties
agreed that a portion of the premiums paid within three years of death
were section 2035 transfers.1 °
Using a Gorman-type theory, the estate claimed that only the value
of the premiums themselves should be included in the gross estate under
section 2035. It was argued that when Congress abolished the premium
payment test under section 2042, it was a clear indication that premium
payments should never be viewed as a basis for including life insurance
proceeds in the gross estate. The court rejected this argument and questioned
whether it was appropriate to borrow the legislative history of section 2042
and apply it to section 2035.101

The court did not, however, concur with the government's reliance on
Revenue Ruling 67-463 as a basis for including a percentage of the proceeds
attributable to the premiums made "in contemplation of death." 10 2 In
rejecting the application of the ruling to the case, the court sought to
determine what actually had been transferred and looked to two section
2036 cases 03 which had dealt with the issue of premium transfers as a

97.

69-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) § 12,574 (W.D. Tex. 1968).

98. Id. The decedent and his wife had, eight years prior to his death,
arranged for their daughters to be owners of insurance policies on the decedent's
life. All premium payments came from community property funds, therefore, the
court concluded that only one-half of the premiums were properly attributable to
the decedent as a transfer made by him. The court deemed the last three premiums
to have been made in contemplation of death. Thus, three-sixteenths (one-half of
three-eighths) of the proceeds were included in the gross estate. Id.
99. 52 T.C. 921 (1969).

100. Id. at 922.
101. Id. at 922-23.
102. Id.at 923.

103.

Goodnow v. United States, 302 F.2d 516 (Ct. Cl. 1962); Estate of Pyle,

313 F.2d
328 (3dofCir.
1963).
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basis for including proceeds in the decedent's estate. Both courts found
that transfers df premium payments did not constitute a transfer of the
proceeds themselves. Based on these holdings and Gorman, the Coleman
court concluded that only the premium payments themselves and not the
corresponding face value of the insurance should be included in the decedent's gross estate.' °4
The majority's position was strongly criticized in three separate dissenting opinions. All three in one way or another criticized the majority's
reading of the Chase definition of "transfer," but differed from one another
primarily on the particular part of the majority's position each sought to
attack. 101 The first focused on the fact that money was never given to the
donees but was actually paid directly to the insurance company for insurance
coverage.10 6 This led to the conclusion that the fruit of that coverage was
the section 2035 asset transferred. 1°7 The second questioned whether one
could actually claim that the donees had purchased the policy and concluded
that, in reality, the decedent was the true owner of the policy from the
inception of the transaction. 0 8 Once established as owner, the usual rules
of valuing section 2035 assets with reference to the decedent's contribution
for them led to the inclusion of a proportionate value of the policy proceeds
supported by the premiums made "in contemplation of death."'19 The last

dissent followed the same path and sought to place the substance of the

104. Id. at 924.
105. Coleman, 52 T.C. at 926-28 (Tietjens, Raum,'Dawson, Js., dissenting).
106. Id. at 926 (Tietjens, J., dissenting).
107. Id. In his dissent, Judge Tietjens wrote:
As I see it the problem is really not whether there was a 'transfer' in
contemplation of death. The taxpayer concedes there was such a transfer
.... The real question is how to value that transfer. I think it should
be valued at what the amounts paid as premiums purchased in the way
of insurance protection and not at what was actually paid for that protection.
Id.
108. Id. at 927 (Raum, J., dissenting). In this dissent, Judge Raum stated,
"Life insurance, like any other property, may be the subject of a gift in contemplation of death. Whatever conclusory terms or euphemisms may be used to describe
the transaction, the decedent in fact purchased the life insurance for her children."
Id.
109. Id. Regarding this point, Judge Raum stated:
If the decedent, in contemplation of death, had purchased a parcel of
real estate for her children, I think there would be no doubt that the
value of that property ....would be includable in her gross estate ....
Similarly, if she had paid only part of the purchase price in contemplation
of death, the proportionate value of the property at the time of her death
would be includable in her gross estate. And when all the smoke has
cleared away here, that is all that remains in this case.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol54/iss3/4
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transaction over its form." 0 Technical ownership was downplayed, and
emphasis was placed on the decedent's actions which gave her an "interest"
in the policy. This interest was transferred and resulted in section 2035
tax accountability."'
Notwithstanding the stinging dissent, Coleman was subsequently followed in a taxpayer victory when FirstNationalBank of Midland v. United
States was heard on appeal by the Fifth Circuit. 1 2 The court, after identifying the case as one of first impression, followed the Gorman and
Coleman rationale in holding that only the value of the premiums themselves, and not the corresponding value of the insurance proceeds attributable to those premiums, was properly includable in the decedent's gross
estate under section 2035. Midland involved a policy taken out more than
three years prior to death with ownership from inception of the policy in
someone other than the deceased-insured. The court noted that the beneficiaries alone had the exclusive right to the policy proceeds from the
date the policy was issued, and were under no duty themselves to allow
anyone else to pay the premiums. By permitting the decedent to pay the
premiums, the beneficiaries had received cash gifts which were used to
maintain the policy. Thus, only the value of the premiums, and not the
corresponding proceeds, were properly includable in the gross estate."'
After suffering defeats in Gorman, Coleman, and Midland, the government relented and issued Revenue Ruling 71-497"1 which revoked Revenue Ruling 67-463. The new ruling conceded that when premiums were
paid by the decedent for insurance policies transferred more than three
years prior to death, only the dollar value of the premiums made in
contemplation of death would be included under section 2035. The ruling
went on to state, however, that renewable term policies obtained within
three years of death and paid for from the decedent's funds would continue
to trigger estate tax accounting for the full proceeds even though someone
other than the decedent was originally designated as owner. The ruling
seemingly equated "purchase in the name of another" with a "transfer,"
a result clearly inconsistent with Gorman and arguably contrary to Coleman.
Thus, it was questionable how much the government had really conceded.

110. Id. at 928 (Dawson, J., dissenting). Judge Dawson stated, "It seems to
me that the majority opinion fans the flickering flame of form. The legal and

economic substance is indeed interred. Too much emphasis is placed on formalities."

Id.
1ll.

Id.

112. First Nat'l Bank v. United States, 423 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1970).
113. The court only addressed the issue of whether any portion of the proceeds
was includable in the gross estate under § 2035 and found that none was. 423
F.2d at 1289. The question of including the value of the premium payments
themselves was not at issue, but clearly was capturable by § 2035. See Bintliff v.
U.S., 462 F.2d 403, 406 (5th Cir. 1972) (citing Midland on this point).
114. Rev. Rul. 71-497, 1971-2 C.B. 329.
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More importantly, did it make any sense to distinguish premium payments

supporting renewable term policies based upon when the policy was originally obtained, or, for that matter, to distinguish renewable term coverage
from other types of policies?
Although not specifically cited, the rationale underlying Revenue Ruling
71-497 was thoroughly approved in Bel v. United States"5 by the same
court that had given taxpayers a victory in Midland. Consistent with the
tack taken in the ruling, the court distinguished Midland on the facts. The
original policy purchase date became the focus of attention: if acquired
more than three years prior to death, Midland controlled; if acquired less
than three years prior to death, Midland was inapplicable.
In Bel, the decedent had purchased an accidental death policy. The
policy was renewable at the end of each one year term. The decedent died
and the policy proceeds were paid within three years of the decedent's
original application for the insurance policy. The estate argued that the
policy was excludable from the gross estate on the theory that, from its
inception, the decedent's children owned it ekclusively. The estate offered
this argument even though the decedent had 1) made the original application
for the policy personally, and 2) paid for all of the premiums until the
6
time of his death."
After deciding the general applicability of section 2035, the court
addressed the issue of "what" the decedent actually had transferred and,
therefore, was properly includable in the gross estate. The district court,
relying on "Coleman, had held that only the premium payments made by
the decedent were to be included in the decedent's gross estate." 7 The
government sought inclusion of the full value of the proceeds arguing that
Coleman was distinguishable on the facts. Specifically, it argued that Coleman involved the acquisition of a policy more than three years prior to
the insured-decedent's death with premium payments made thereafter until
death. In Bel, the policy itself was purchased within three years of death.
Thus, if acquisition of the policy in the names of the children was deemed
the "transfer," the entire policy would be the property that was the subject
of a section 2035 transfer.
The court distinguished Coleman. Of primary importance was the timing
of the original acquisition of the policy." 8 In the instant case, where the
policy was acquired and all of the premium payments made within three
years of the decedent's death, essentially, "every stick in the bundle of

115.

452 F.2d 683 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 919 (1972).

116. Id. at 686.
117.

310 F. Supp. 1189 (W.D. La. 1970).

118. 452 F.2d at 690. One should remember that in Coleman the policy was
taken out more than three years prior to death. Coleman, 52 T.C. at 921. The
government sought to include both the premiums paid within three years of death
and the proceeds of the policy attributable to those premiums. Id. at 924.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol54/iss3/4
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rights constituting the policy and its proceeds had its genesis" within the
restricted statutory period. 119 Thus, the court concluded it was inappropriate

20
to use the premium payments as the measure of the section 2035 interest.
The court further questioned whether the district court had focused
on the proper inquiry. It believed that consideration of what the decedent
had "parted with" was unimportant.' 2 ' In its interpretation of Chase and
the definition of "transfer" for the purposes of the estate tax, the court
indicated that the so-called "diversion" principal was an improper method
of approaching the problem.' = The court suggested the appropriate interpretation of "transfer" is "not limited to the passing of property directly
from donor to the transferee, but encompasses a donation 'procured through
expenditures by the decedent with the purpose, affected at his death, of

having it passed to another.'12n In sum, the court believed that to sanction
the practice of avoiding estate taxation when the decedent, during his life,

permits beneficiaries to take the policy out on him while he still makes
all the premium payments, represents a charade which operates as an
effective statutory-emasculating device. The court held, to do so frustrates
the statutory effort to collect tax from these transfers and prevent tax
motivated estate reduction.
The court refocused its attention on what it called the "control beam
of the word 'transfer. '' 2 It concluded that,
[T]he decedent, and the decedent alone, beamed the accidental death policy
at his children, for by paying the premium he designated ownership of
the policy and created in his children all of the contractual rights of the
insurance benefits. These were acts of transfer. The policy was not procured
and ownership designated and designed by some goblin or hovering spirit.'2

The court noted that this situation should be treated no differently than
if the decedent had taken out the policy in his own name and, within
three years of death, irrevocably assigned all rights of ownership to another
beneficiary yet continued to pay the premiums. 2 6 In that instance, section
2035 would properly impose the tax. The court viewed that transaction as

"functionally indistinguishable" from the situation at hand. 2 7
There is little doubt that in reaching its decision, the Fifth Circuit
sought to establish a rule that transfers of life insurance made within the

119.

452 F.2d at 690.

120. Id.
121.

Id.

122. Id.
123. Id. at 691 (quoting Chase Nat'l Bank v. United States, 278 U.S. 327,
337 (1929)).

124. See id.
125. Id. (emphasis added).
126. Id. at 692.
127. Id.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1989

25

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 54, Iss. 3 [1989], Art. 4

624

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 54

time frame of section 2035, no matter how disguised, are includable in
the gross estate at their full proceed amount. Although the court might
have been willing to accept inclusion of only the premiums paid by the
decedent-insured when the policy itself was transferred beyond the three
year period prior to death, it clearly rejected the Gorman decision as too
restrictive in its interpretation of the word "transfer." With this, "constructive transfers" of life insurance entered the scene.
2
Two other significant cases, DetroitBank & Trust Co. v. United States 1
1
29
and First National Bank of Oregon v. United States, followed suit and
taxed the proceeds of a life insurance policy taken out within three years
of the decedent's death in the names of the beneficiaries and never owned
by the decedent. Further proof that the Bel decision was to carry the day
30
came when the Tax Court revisited the issue in Kuriharav. Commissioner.
In Kurihara, the decedent established a trust and subsequently had the
trustee apply for insurance on the settlor-decedent's life. The settlor signed
the application and issued a check in the exact amount of the premium
payable to the trustee. The trustee, in turn, endorsed the check over to
the insurance company. The settlor subsequently died within three years
of the transaction. The government sought inclusion of all of the policy
proceeds in the gross estate under section 2035. The estate argued that the
decedent had no rights in the trust. Further, he could not have transferred
the insurance policy within three years of death; he never had any interest
in the policy to transfer. The Tax Court reviewed the previous cases on
point and concluded that Bel was controlling.' Although Coleman and
its progeny were not specifically rejected, the court was able to distinguish
them on the grounds that in those cases the policy was acquired more
than three years prior to the decedent's death. In finding for the government,
the court addressed two questions and answered them in a manner that
required inclusion. The first was, "[D]id the payment of the initial and
only premium within the proscribed three year period create the ownership
right in the policy on the decedent's life?" and the second, "[D]id the
decedent pay that premium?"''3 2
As to the first question, following the Bel rationale, the court deemed
the mere fact that the decedent did not formally acquire and then transfer

128. 467 F.2d 964 (6th Cir. 1972).
129. 488 F.2d 575 (9th Cir. 1973).
130. 82 T.C. 51 (1984).
131. See id.
132. Id. at 60. The court stated:
We think it clear from the foregoing analysis that the ultimate questions
in the instant case are: (1) Did the payment of the initial (and only)

premium within the proscribed 3-year period create the ownership rights
in the policy on the decedent's life; (2) did the decedent pay that premium?

We think that both questions should be answered in the affirmative.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol54/iss3/4
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the policy immaterial. The "beaming" of ownership rights from the totality
of the transaction was deemed critical. 33 For the second question, the court
concluded that it was of little consequence whether the decedent had made
the premium payment personally, directly to the insurance company, or
directed it to the insurance company through an agent.3 4 It was clear in
Kuriharathat the trustee under some fiduciary duty principle had no choice
but to endorse over the check; therefore, he was merely acting as the

decedent's agent. This, in essence, created the ownership rights in the trustee
and constituted the transfer.
The court did recognize that, without the agency theory argument, it
would be possible to demonstrate there was no transfer. This wrinkle was
presented in Hope v. United States.'"5 The Hope court recognized the
distinction between buying insurance for someone on one hand, and on
the other, giving that person money which was then subsequently used to
purchase insurance on the donor's life. Nevertheless, it opined that, in
order to avoid recognition of a transfer, some showing must be made that
the use of funds for that particular purpose was not under an agency or
36
the otherwise controlled direction of the donor.
Hope can be read to stand for the proposition that the use of the
insured's money to fund a life insurance policy on the insured is not, as
a matter of law, a transfer for purposes of section 2035. Indeed, the case
seems to leave room for maneuvering on the agency issue. In Kurihara,
there was sufficient evidence for finding an agency relationship, and clearly
an undertone in the opinion that such an agency would be hard to disprove
in this type of case. 137 Illustrative is Traub v. United States,138 where a
district court, relying on Bel, 39 had little difficulty in concluding that the
Hope rationale was inapplicable when the premium was from the donordecedent's own personal funds.' 40
When the opportunity arose, however, the Tax Court was not bent
on expanding Kurihara and confined its application to its own specific
facts. In Estate of Clay v. Commissioner, 41 the court rejected the government's attempt to extend Kuriharato permit funds tracing for attributing

133. Id.
134. Id.
135. 691 F.2d 786 (5th Cir. 1982).
136. Id. at 789.
137. Kurihara, 82 T.C. at 59.
138. 58 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) § 148, 155 (1986).
139. The court found that the taxpayer's reliance on Hope was misplaced
primarily because the facts of Hope were distinguishable, while the facts of Bel
and First National Bank were directly on point. It thus stated, "This case is
controlled by Bel v. United States and FirstNationalBank of Oregon." Id. (citations
omitted).
140. 58 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) § 148, 155 (1986).
141. 86 T.C. 1266 (1986).
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premiums to the decedent for a policy on his life taken out and paid for
by his spouse. In declining to adopt the government's expansive reading
of Kurihara, the court pointed out that it had been decided against the
Bel backdrop and "must be understood in that context."' 14 2 Emphasizing
that the source of the premium is not determinative, the court noted that
the totality of the transaction is the proper focal point of the analysis.
The degree of control exercised by the decedents over the entire transactions
in both Kurihara and Bel made the premium payments "transfers" of the
policies, In Clay, the decedent was almost incidental to the play, lending
little more than his spouse's use of her insurable interest in him. 43 Such
cooperation did not constitute a transfer.
Subsequently, in Schnack v. Commissioner, the Tax Court reaffirmed
the position stated in Clay.' 44 In Schnack, the taxpayers prevailed even
though the decedent and her spouse intentionally arranged the purchase
and ownership of life insurance in an effort to avoid estate taxation of
the proceeds. The husband was designated as owner, beneficiary, and
applicant of the policy on his wife's life. Premiums were paid from a joint
bank account similar to the one at issue in Clay. 141
The court noted its obligation to follow the Ninth Circuit's position,
stated, in First National Bank of Oregon, that section 2035 applies "where
life insurance policies are procured at the instance [sic] of the deceased
within the [statutory] period and the premiums are paid either directly or
indirectly by the deceased.' '1 46 But, relying upon Clay, the court concluded
that the the decedent had not paid the premiums. Therefore, the facts did
not meet the second prong of the Ninth Circuit's test and the proceeds
were properly excludable from the decedent's gross estate. 147
The "hope" for escaping estate tax on "constructive transfers," dashed
by Kurihara but rekindled by Clay and Schnack, received a stiff blow
when the Ninth Circuit reversed Schnack. 4 Relying heavily on its decision
in Oregon, the Court reiterated its "substance over form" approach and
found that the decedent had indeed made a transfer within the ambit of
section 2035. The court suggested that Clay was either improperly decided
or should be read narrowly to apply only in those instances where the
deceased-insured is a passive participant and truly incidental to the trans149
action.
These cases left one questioning the prospect of future taxpayer successes. The "constructive transfer" doctrine still applied to life insurance

142. Id. at 1272.
143. Id. at 1267-70.
144. 55 Tax Ct. Mem. Dec. (P-H) § 86,570 (1986).
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. 848 F.2d 933 (9th Cir. 1988).
149. Id. at 939-40.
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payable on the life of the non-owner-insureds. Clever estate planning maneuvers were not going to carry the day, at least not until the Tax Court
decided Leder.
D. Phase III
As noted earlier,5 0 section 2035, although sharply curtailed in Phase

III, retained its vitality for transfers of life insurance. Thus, Phase II cases
defining the role of "constructive transfers" seemed still to have an important role in Phase III, at least until the Leder court concluded that a
"plain reading" of the statute mooted the "constructive transfer" or
"beaming" of life insurance issue. This result may not have surprised all,
yet clearly it caught the government off-guard. Just a short time earlier,
in Private Letter Ruling 85-09005,111 the government had reasoned to an
opposite result in its first Phase III interpretation of section 2035. Although
private letter rulings are not citable precedent, 5 ' they, nevertheless, reflect
government sentiment on particular tax issues. In the letter ruling, it was
clear that the government saw little reason to back away from the success
the "constructive transfer" doctrine had provided in Phase II. Relying on
the legislative history of the statute's new version 3' and Oregon, the letter
ruling concluded that the purchase of insurance by someone in the name
of another "cannot be distinguished from the procurement of [insurance]
in [one's] own name" with the immediate transfer of all ownership rights
to the other person. 5 4 The letter ruling also found a way to overcome the
obstacle of the decedent never having had the newly imposed requisite
"subsection (d)(2)" interest in the policies. It resorted to legislative history
that suggested life insurance retained the same treatment in Phase III as
it was given in Phase II.111 In sum, if Oregon applied, then section 2035(d)
was not intended to alter the rule of exposing life insurance to estate tax
accounting pursuant to a "constructive transfer" theory.
A first blush reading of the letter ruling leads one to conclude that
the right result was reached, but a closer reading clearly shows it was
probably for the wrong reasons. Section 2035(d)(2) does not, as interpreted
by the letter ruling, require only a "transfer." If it did, the result would
be correct. The provision, however, specifically requires the transfer of an
interest in property which by itself would cause inclusion in the gross estate
had such a transfer not been made. Although Bel and its progeny are

150. See supra notes 44-54 and accompanying text.
151. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 85-09005 (Nov. 28, 1985).
152. Every private letter ruling states that it is not usable as authority and
may be relied upon only by the taxpayer to whom it is addressed, citing to I.R.C.
§ 61100)(3) (1982 & Supp. 1987).
153. See infra notes 167-68.
154. Id.

155. Id.
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perhaps still good law on whether the decedent actually made a transfer,
it is questionable whether any of the opinions seriously addressed the issue
of what the decedent had actually transferred that permitted the application
of section 2035.156 For section 2035(a) to have applied in either Phases I
or II, only a transfer of some interest was required. 5 7 The transfer itself
was the crucial subject of scrutiny. There was never any requirement that
the transfer be of a specific interest in property. Seemingly, that was the
teaching of Estate of Porter v. United States.'58
In Porter, the decedent's surviving spouse received, from the decedent's
employer, certain death benefits that were not otherwise includable in his
gross estate unless capturable as a transfer in contemplation of death. 15 9
The court determined that the decedent had made a transfer of the benefits
within the meaning of section 2035 and, within the statutorily proscribed
period. On this point it stated, "[Tlhe term 'transfer' 'must, we think, at
least include the transfer of property procured through expenditures by the
decedent with the purpose, effected at his death, of having it pass to
another."' 60 The decedent's continued employment for the company was
seen as a quid pro quo for the company's promise to pay the benefits at
the time of his death. The decedent's participation permitted him to, in
effect, transfer a gift of the benefits to his wife. Even though it might
have been difficult to determine the value of the gift at the time it was
made, the court noted that it is unnecessary to compute that figure since
the measure of the estate tax is the value of the property transferred at
death. 161 It was fairly easy to determine what was payable at death. Thus,
even though the decedent might not have possessed any palpable interest
in the benefits, there was a transfer of the right to receive them, and that
was sufficient for section 2035 to apply.
While Private Letter Ruling 85-09005 was correct in concluding there
was a "transfer," it failed to distinguish between Porter-type transfers of
non-specific property interests includable under section 2035 in Phases I
and II, and transfers of certain statutorily enumerated interests, now the
only gifts recaptured in the gross estate under section 2035. The letter
ruling seemed content to look to the legislative history of "subsection (d)"

156. But see infra notes 194-98 and accompanying text discussing conclusions
reached in Bel, First National Bank of Oregon, and Schnack.
157. In Phases I and II, section 2035 and its predecessors required transfers
of an interest within the statutorily prescribed period. See I.R.C. § 2035 (1982).
The term "interest" was neither defined nor limited in the statute. See id.
158. 442 F.2d 915 (5th Cir. 1971).
159. Id. at 916. The court addressed the question of whether the payments
could be included in the decedent's gross estate under section 2039 as an "annuity

or other payment," but concluded that the section was inapplicable. Id.
160. Id. at 917 (quoting Chase Nat'l Bank v. United States, 278 U.S. 327,
337 (1929)).
161. Id.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol54/iss3/4
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and conclude that life insurance was intended to be given the same tax
treatment after the 1981 amendments as it received before the changes.
Ironically, the Leder court's scrutiny of the legislative history and the
Congressional intent resulted in an interpretation directly opposite the one
suggested in the letter ruling. 6 2
The facts of Leder are quite similar to that of the letter ruling. The
decedent's spouse applied for and owned, from the date of issuance, a
policy on her husband's life. All of the premiums were paid for by the
decedent's wholly-owned corporation and, thus, were properly attributable
to him. 631 Application for, issuance of, and all premium payments with
respect to the policy occurred within three years of the decedent's death.
The Tax Court rejected the government's effort to include the proceeds
in the decedent's gross estate under section 2035 by concluding that the
section was inapplicable.IM
In reaching its result, the court noted that the Phase III general rule
excludes gifts made within three years of death from the gross estate unless
overridden by subsection (d)(2). In order for (d)(2) to apply to the instant
case, the decedent must have transferred a property interest taxable under
section 2042 within three years of his death. The court specifically stated
that "[t]he plain language of section 2035(d)(2) requires as a threshold
issue that there be an interest in property under the terms of the sections
it lists (e.g. sec. 2042). It requires that the decedent transfer ...

an interest

that would have been included [in the gross estate] if the decedent had
retained such an interest."' 65 According to the court, the decedent must
have, at one time, possessed one of the interests listed in the section. If
such an interest was owned and then transferred within three years of
death, (d)(2) would apply and the corresponding asset could be included
in the gross estate. 6 6 Absent possession of such an interest and its transfer,
the court believed Congress intended (d)(1) to provide that nothing be
pulled into the gross estate under section 2035.
The government argued that such a reading of the statute was too
constrained and inconsistent with the legislative history. Specific references
to the Senate 16 7 and House 68 reports were made in an effort to demonstrate

162. 89 T.C. 235, 238 (1987).
163. The court "assumed[d] ...that by virtue of decedent's wholly owned
corporation paying the policy premiums, the decedent [had] paid the premiums."
Id. at 244 n.ll.
164. Leder, 89 T.C. at 244.
165. Id. at 240-41.
166. See id. at 240 n.8.
167. The relevant Senate report from the Finance Committee, S. REP. No.
97-144, 97th Cong., 1st Sess 138-39 (1981), is as follows:
E. Estate Tax Treatment of Transfers Made Within Three Years of DePublished by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1989
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that Congress intended to continue the special treatment accorded transfers

cedent's Death (sec. 405 of the bill and sees. 1014 and 2035 of the Code)
Present Law
Under present law, transfers made by a decedent within three years
of death are included in the decedent's gross estate without regard to
whether the gifts were made in contemplation of death. A gift included
in the decedent's gross estate is valued at the time of decedent's death
(or alternative valuation date, if elected). However, any gift tax paid is
allowed as a credit against the decedent's estate tax. In general, the net
effect of these two provisions is to include in the decedent's gross estate
the property's appreciation in value from the date of the gift until the
date of death.
An exception to these rules applies with respect to transfers of property
(other than transfers with respect to a life insurance policy) where no gift
tax return was required to be filed with respect to the gift. Thus, a gift
for which no gift tax return was required is generally not included in the
decedent's gross estate, while a gift subject to the filing requirements is
included at its appreciated value, without reduction for the amount of the
gift tax annual exclusion.
Generally, where an interest is brought back into the estate, the donee's
basis in such interest is its date of death fair market value, reduced by
amounts claimed by the donee as deductions in computing taxable income
prior to the decedent's death.
Reasons for Change
The committee generally does not believe it appropriate to tax appreciation that accrues after a gift has been made under the unified estate
and gift taxes merely because the donor died within 3 years of the gift.
The present rule often results in needless administrative burdens in valuing
property twice. However, the committee believes that complete repeal of
section 2035 for gifts other than life insurance would allow decedents to
arrange their estates on their death bed in order to qualify for certain
provisions which depend upon the size and make-up of the gross estate
(e.g., secs. 303, 2032A and 6166). Accordingly, the committee believes
that it is appropriate to include gifts made within 3 years of death at
their value at the time of the gift.
The change does not modify the valuation rules with respect to transfers
of property included in a decedent's gross estate because (1) the decedent
retained the beneficial enjoyment of the property during life, or the power
to alter, amend, or revoke a previous lifetime transfer; (2) the property
was transferred previously by the decedent but the transfer takes effect
at the decedent's death; (3) the decedent possessed a power of appointment
over the property; or (4) with respect to the proceeds of life insurance,
the decedent possessed an incident of ownership or the proceeds are
receivable by the decedent's executor. Thus, such property would 4till be
included in the decedent's gross estate at date of death fair market value.
For example, if one year prior to death, a decedent transferred all incidents
of ownership in a life insurance policy to a third party, the entire amount
of the proceeds would be included in the decedent's gross estate pursuant
to sections 2035 and 2042.
168. The relevant House report from the Ways and Means Committee, H.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol54/iss3/4
R. REP. No. 97-201, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 186-87 (1981), is as follows:
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631

of life insurance under the pre-"subsection (d)" era. After stating its view
' 69
that one must produce "unequivocal evidence of legislative purpose' 1

G. Estate Tax Treatment of Transfers Made Within 3 Years of Decedent's
Death.

Reasons for Change
Under the law prior to the Tax Reform Act of 1976, gifts made in
contemplation of death (other than gifts made more than 3 years before
the decedent's death) were included in a decedent's gross estate to prevent
deathbed transfers designed to avoid estate taxes. However, the prior law
presumption that gifts made within 3 years of death were made in contemplation of death caused considerable litigation concerning the motives
of decedents in making gifts. As a result, Congress, in 1976, eliminated
the problem by requiring the inclusion of all such gifts in a decedent's
estate without regard to the motives of the decedent.
Under the unified transfer tax system adopted in the Tax Reform Act
of 1976, the inclusion in the gross estate of gifts made within 3 years of
death generally has the effect of including only the property's post-gift
appreciation in the gross estate (because the gift tax paid with respect to
the transfer is allowed as a credit against the decedent's estate tax). The
committee believes that inclusions of such appreciation generally is unnecessary except for gifts of life insurance and certain property included
in the gross estate pursuant to certain of the so-called transfer sections
(sec. 2036, 2037, 2038, 2041, and 2042). However, gifts made within 3
years of death should be included in a decedent's gross estate to determine
the estate's eligibility for favorable redemption, valuation, and deferral
provisions (under secs. 303, 2032A, and 6166) to preclude deathbed transfers
designed to qualify that estate for such favorable treatment.

Explanation of Provision
In general, the bill provides that section 2035(a) will not be applicable
to the estates of decedents dying after December 31, 1981. Thus, gifts
made within 3 years of death will not be included in the decedent's gross
estate, and the post-gift appreciation will not be subject to transfer taxes.
Accordingly, such property will not be considered to pass from the decedent
and the step-up basis rules of section 1014 will not apply.
The committee bill contains exceptions which continue the application
of section 2035(a) to (1) gifts of life insurance and (2) interests in property
otherwise included in the value of the gross estate pursuant to sections
2036, 2037, 2038, 2041 or 2042 (or those which would have been included
under any of such sections if the interest had been retained by the decedent).
In addition, all transfers within 3 years of death (other than gifts
eligible for the annual gift tax exclusion) will be included for purposes

of determining the estate's qualification for special redemption, valuation,

and deferral purposes (under secs. 303, 2032A, and 6166) and for purposes
of determining property subject to the estate tax liens (under subchapter
C of Chapter 64).
Section 2035(c), requiring the inclusion of all gift taxes paid by the
decedent or his estate on any gift made by the decedent or his spouse
after December 31, 1976, and within 3 years of death, will continue to
apply to all estates.
169. 89 T.C. at 240.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1989
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before the plain meaning of words in a statute can be overridden, 170 the
court had little difficulty in dismissing the government's arguments
with
17
its own review and interpretation of the legislative history. '
The court commenced its attack on the government's pronouncement
of Congressional intent by noting that the Senate Finance Report'72 cited
by the government was without significance since "[the] conference agreement follow[ed] the House bill. ' 17 The court viewed the conference report's
reliance on the House bill's "specific" rather than general terms as negating
the Senate Report for the purposes of establishing intent. It further found
that the House bill's specific reference to retain special treatment for life
insurance, 74 was of no import since 1) Congress never enacted the exception, 75 and 2) "the specific reference to life insurance in the House
report was not repeated in the Conference report.' 7 76 Thus, the court
adopted the position that Congress could have singled out life insurance
transfers for continued selective section 2035 treatment, but eschewed the
opportunity. Further, the court said insufficient support existed in the
legislative history to uphold a statutory Interpretation that would have
177
created a result not specifically endorsed by Congress.
The issue of whether the decedent had made a taxable Bel-type or
non-taxable Clay-type transfer was never reached. 78 The decedent had never
possessed a section 2042 taxable interest concerning the insurance and,
consequently, could never have transferred one.1 79 Since the Phase III version
of the statute required the decedent to have made a transfer of a section
2042 taxable interest within three years of death, the court concluded that
the statute could not apply.8 0 Both a taxable interest and its transfer had
to be present. Once it was determined that the decedent never had possessed
a taxable interest in the policy, it became unnecessary to inquire whether

170. Id. at 240-41 (citing Huntsberry v. Commissioner, 83 T.C. 742, 747-48
(1984)).
171.
172.

Id. at 241-42.
See supra note 167.
173. 89 T.C. at 241 (citing H. R. REP. No. 97-215, 97th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1981), reprinted in 1981-2 C.B. 481, 511.

174. See H. R. REP. No. 97-201, supra note 168.
175. 89 T.C. at 242.
176. Id.
177. Id. (citing United States v. American College of Physicians, 475 U.S.
834, 846 (1986)). The court said, "Although we may resort in some circumstances

to the legislative history to find Congress' intent, we are hesitant to rely on inclusive
history to supply a provision not enacted by Congress." Id.
178. The court specifically noted that it was not deciding the issue of whether
a transfer had occurred, which would have triggered section 2035(a) in Phases I
and II. Id. at 244 n.12.
179. Id. at 244.
180. Id.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol54/iss3/4
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he had made a transfer.'
82
the gross estate.

Consequently, the proceeds were excluded from

Shortly after Leder was decided, Private Letter Ruling 88-006004,111
addressing the application of section 2035 to life insurance, was issued.
Although the actual result would lead one to conclude to the contrary, it
seems that in its approach to the problem the ruling tacitly accepts the
Leder interpretation of section 2035(d)(2). The specific facts involved a
transfer of insurance by a corporation to certain individuals. The controlling
shareholder died within three years of the corporation's transfer of the
insurance. The government reasoned that the decedent had an interest in
the insurance taxable under section 2042 by virtue of her stock ownership;
a position well-founded in the treasury regulations.'m Having identified the
requisite section 2042 interest, there was little difficulty in showing the
transfer. Thus, subsection (d)(2) applied and forced estate tax accounting
for the insurance proceeds.
No doubt the ruling was technically correct, and reached a result
consistent with both the letter and the spirit of section 2035(d)(2). But
perhaps of greater interest than the result itself, was the manner in which
it was reached. Unlike Private Letter Ruling 85-09005, this letter ruling
did not delve into legislative history in an effort to equate Phase II treatment
of life insurance with its Phase III counterpart. Of course, one can argue
there was no need to do so. The transaction in issue fell within a "plain
reading" of the statute. Conversely, the government could have just as
easily followed a Phase II-type argument employed in Private Letter Ruling
85-09005 to reach the same result. The ruling could well have rejected, or
at the least, criticized Leder, but it did neither. Instead of making subsection
(d)(2) a direct access to the "subsection (b) exception" for life insurance,
the ruling analyzed the transaction in "Leder-esque" terms and lent credence
to the view that the Leder rationale may have been accepted.
Because private letter rulings are not citable as precedent, it is difficult
to put too much stock in what any one letter ruling holds. This is especially
true if the ruling is used for what it did not state or do rather than for
what it specifically held. Despite these observations, one cannot totally
disregard the shift in approach taken in the ruling. A deliberate effort was
made to fit the transaction into the precise wording of the statute. Was
this just competent legal methodology, or was it a recognition that merely
meeting a supposed spirit of the law is not sufficient for tax exposure on

181. Id. at 244 n. 12.
182. The decision by necessity presupposes that the decedent did not possess
any incidents of ownership in the policy so as to render section 2042 inapplicable.
See id. at 244.
183. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 88-06004 (Nov. 4, 1987).
184. See Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-1(c)(6) (1988).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1989
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these matters anymore? It is suggested that some language in the rulings
themselves supports the latter.
In Private Letter Ruling 85-09005, the government specifically rejected
the notion that a decedent must have formally possessed a section 2042type interest in a policy as a pre-requisite to applying subsection (d)(2).
The ruling seemingly concluded that a constructive transfer of life insurance
satisfied the statutory test. In it, the government read the legislative history
as showing Congress' intent to continue the Phase II treatment of life
insurance transfers in Phase III, despite the addition of subsection (d)(2)
to the statute. The Leder court rejected the government's reading of the
legislative history, and in doing so, dismantled that argument for estate
taxation of life insurance transfers.
Private Letter Ruling 88-06004 specifically requires that, in Phase III,
for gifts to be included in the gross estate pursuant to section 2035, there
must be a transfer of an interest that would have caused inclusion in the
gross estate had the decedent retained the interest. Clearly, the letter ruling
is recognizing that more than a mere "transfer" is needed to trigger
subsection (d)(2). Even if the ruling is not an outright acceptance of Leder,
undoubtedly it represents a step toward the Leder view. Time will tell, but
it is very likely that Leder, if unchallenged, has started the movement that
will end the reign of the "constructive transfer" doctrine in the realm of
life insurance transfers.
IV.

LONG LvE THm LEDER

Where to from here? Is change warranted or, for that matter, desirable?
Has Leder made the waters of aggressive tax planning safe to enter again?
Will Congress move to re-create the pre-Phase III tax treatment for all
"constructive transfers" of life insurance, or will it be content to let these
few transactions fall through the cracks?
Of course, if Leder is ultimately rejected, the substance of these questions could be mooted. At this time, that does not appear to be likely.
Moreover, if the failure in Private Letter Ruling 88-006004 to criticize
Leder is any indication, no change in direction is forthcoming. In fact,
the Tax Court, citing Leder, has reaffirmed its view regarding its obligation
to follow a plain reading of the statute."8 5 Therefore, it is more likely that
any movement toward a strict application of the Bel-Kurihara approach
for these phantom transactions will come from another source.
One potential line of attack against Leder involves the development
of an "imputed interest" corollary to the constructive transfer theory. The
corollary supports a view similar, but not congruent, to the one raised in

185. See Segel v. Commissioner,
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol54/iss3/4 89 T.C. 816, 841 (1988).
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Revenue Ruling 67-463.116 In that ruling, the government tried to equate
each premium payment to a corresponding proportionate interest in the
policy itself. As already noted, this position was soundly rejected by the
courts. 8 7 It is an outcome subject to challenge given that a similar argument
had carried the day regarding donee contributions to life insurance that
were found to be taxable pursuant to section 2035.188 It is curious that
the government did not seize upon this treatment of post-transfer donee
premium payment as a corresponding interest in the policy as its theory
to support the basis for Revenue Ruling 67-463. If premium payments
constitute corresponding interests in the policy for contribution purposes,
there may not be any compelling reason to treat them differently for
inclusion purposes.8 9 The point need not be pressed. The "imputed interest"
corollary does not equate a premium payment with a corresponding interest
in the supported policy. Rather, the corollary follows the Bel tack and
looks to the totality of the transaction in its quest for identification and
recognition of any section 2042 interest passed along by a constructive
transfer. Indeed, it seems odd that the government accepted Bel for acknowledging "constructive transfers" but not for arguing "imputed interests." After all, how can there be a transfer, even a "constructive" one,
without a concomitant interest being moved along?
One might respond that the Porter court found a transfer without a
corresponding interest. Although perhaps not specifically identified as such,
something was nonetheless transferred. The naked "right to receive" the

death benefit was the interest transferred. True, the benefit was speculative
and difficult to value at any time prior to the decedent's death, but this
was of no import to the court.19° The transfer of an interest, regardless
186. See supra notes 84, 89-92 and accompanying text.
187. See supra notes 93-111 and accompanying text.
188. See Estate of Silverman v. Commissioner, 521 F.2d 574 (2nd Cir. 1975);
Liebmann v. Hassett, 148 F.2d 247 (1st Cir. 1945).
189. It seems odd that the same action paying premium can be treated as
contribution for donees when making a case for exclusion of proceeds, but not
as contribution by the donor when arguing for inclusion of the proceeds. Giving
the donee beneficiaries their due is consistent with the treatment accorded contribution for other Section 2035 assets. This is especially true in light of the fact
that they are under no obligation to continue the policy in force. But, it does not
follow that donor's continued payments are any less "contributions." There does
not appear to be a "compelling" reason to justify why donees' premium payments
represent a corresponding percentage interest in the proceeds, while similar payments
by donors represent only dollar-for-dollar gifts. Neither party is under any obligation
to make the payment. The crucial test should be the effect of the payment, not
its source.
190. In Porter, the court specifically stated that the date of death value was
the only item of importance. Estate of Porter V.Commissioner, 442 F.2d 915, 919
(1st Cir. 1975). The court cited Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 111 (1940):
"The taxable event is a transfer inter vivos. But the measure of the tax is the
value of the transferred property at the time when death brings it into enjoyment."
Id. at
919.
Published
by University
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of its date of gift value, was all that was necessary for Section 2035 to
apply. 191 Surely a "right to receive" can rise to the dignity of an "interest"
for estate tax purposes when other more speculative contingent interests
are given that status. 192
Although the court found a transfer of an interest in Porter, section
2035 no longer embraces that transaction. Now, subsection (d)(2) generates
inclusion treatment only for limited types of interests, and Mrs. Porter's
"right to receive" was not one of those interests. While subsection (d)(2)
requires a transfer of a section 2042-type interest, it is not altogether clear
exactly what that means. Must there be a transfer of a specific interest in
the life insurance policy proper, or can the transfer be of something less
than that to generate tax accountability? Does the statute require a transfer
of the thing itself, or only of anything that, had the decedent retained it,
would have caused inclusion of the proceeds under section 2042? This
inquiry directs attention to "incidents of ownership," the criteria for subjecting life insurance not payable to or for the benefit of the estate to
taxation under section 2042. Specifically, is an incident of ownership an
"interest" in the life insurance policy embraced by subsection (d)(2)? If
so, does a "constructive transfer" pass any "incident of ownership"? If
answered in the affirmative, Leder becomes unsupportable.
What then is the interest transferred by an insured who permits someone
else to apply for and own a life insurance policy on the insured's life?
The insurable interest one possesses in oneself is an interest common to
all life insurance purchases. Although easily identifiable, it is questionable
whether the insurable interest in the policy belongs to the insured rather
than the applicant whom the company permits to obtain the policy. Moreover, an insurable interest is not truly an economic benefit in the policy
classifiable as an incident of ownership-the crucial test for applying section
2042.193 Thus, in any set of circumstances, passively allowing one's own
life to be insured by and for the benefit of another should not be sufficient
to invoke section 2035. The requisite interest must, at the least, be of a
type which would trigger tax exposure under section 2042 if the decedent
had retained the interest. Whether the constructive transfer cases involve
the transfer of such interests is the crucial issue.

191. Id. at 917 n.2.
192. "A contingent interest belonging to a decedent at his death will be taxed
to his estate under section 2033 if the contingency is something other than the
decedent's survival so that he has an interest which he can transfer at death. C.
LowNDEs, R. KRAMER & J. McCoiw, supra note 27, § 4.10.
193. See Estate of Beauregard v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 603 (1980). Courts
have also suggested that merely possessing the right to pay premiums, something
all insureds could retain, is not an incident of ownership. See Gorman v. United
States, 288 F. Supp. 225, 232 (E.D. Mich. 1968) (citing MacKay, Life Insurance
in the Estate Plan, 43 B.U.L. REv. 275 (1962)).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol54/iss3/4
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It is difficult to identify the precise interest transferred in Bel. The
court stated that the decedent "never formally possessed any of the incidents
of ownership in the [insurance] policy," but went on to explain why the
proceeds were, nonetheless the subject of the transfer. 194 Unfortunately,
the court blurred the distinction between the transfer itself and the exact
thing being transferred. An unsurprising result given that the thrust of the
opinion sought to overcome the more difficult obstacle of demonstrating
the functional equivalence of the decedent's actions to an actual transfer,
than to identify the interest being transferred. There was no identification
of the specific interest transferred. Instead, the court seemed at ease in
allowing logic to dictate that once a transfer was found, by necessity, the
decedent had to have had some kind of interest, which was all the statute
required at that time. In a somewhat conclusory manner, the court ultimately
determined that the decedent had in fact transferred the entire policy itself.' 95
In FirstNational Bank of Oregon, the issue was framed more precisely.
The court specifically inquired whether the decedent's actions in the case
under review resulted in a transfer of the policy proceeds, and the answer
was yes.' 96 As in Bel, the court's analysis was geared more toward establishing the transfer itself rather than identifying the underlying interest

transferred. But, the court did rule that a constructive transfer of life
insurance, by necessity, must pass an interest in the policy. 197 Subsequently,
in Schnack, the court identified the proceeds of the policy as the interest
passed along by the constructive transfer. 98
Do these opinions recognize the transfer of an interest to which section
2035(d)(2) could apply, or do constructive transfers of life insurance pass
Porter-like rights not within the ambit of the statute? Bel focused on the
totality of the transaction, and not on its isolated events. Thus, unsurprisingly it found a transfer of the entire policy. If taken at face value,
arguably, Bel supports the view that constructive transfers of life insurance
should be treated in Phase III as they were in Phase II. A transfer of the
entire policy itself, which carries with it all of the incidents of ownership,
is an interest in the policy within the plain reading of "subsection (d)(2)."
Under such an analysis, Leder becomes unsupportable. An even tougher

194. Bel v. United States, 452 F.2d 683, 691 (5th Cir. 1971).
195. Id. at 692.
196. The court stated, "It is not disputed that the premiums were paid and

the policies procured in contemplation of death. The sole issue on appeal is whether
the property interest transferred was the proceeds of the policies . . . , or only
the premiums advanced .

. . ."

First Nat'l Bank of Oregon v. United Sates, 488

F.2d 575, 576 (9th Cir. 1973).
197. Id. at 577. Regarding this point, the court said, "Thus where a policy
is both procured at the behest of the decedent within the statutory period and
where all the premiums are paid by the deceased in contemplation of death, the

gift must necessarily be one of the property interest in the policy. Id.
198. Estate of Schnack v. Commissioner, 848 F.2d 933, 936 (9th Cir. 1988).

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1989

39

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 54, Iss. 3 [1989], Art. 4

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 54

question arises if a constructive transfer passes something less than what
was suggested by Bel.
Leder could arguably be consistent with Oregon and Schnack if these
decisions are read to mean that the interest in the proceeds conveyed by
a constructive transfer is a Porter-type right and not an interest in the
policy. Most probably, this position would prove difficult to defend. In
Porter, the right to receive proceeds was supported only by the decedent's
continued employment. Estate tax accountability could not be found under
sections 2036, 2037, 2038 or 2042 (the sections specifically creating the
subsection (d)(2) exclusions) for such a transaction, therefore, the decedent
could not have transferred an interest to which subsection (d)(2) would
apply. If the right to proceeds in an insurance policy is not an interest in
the policy, then a similar argument can be fashioned. But will this proposition pass tax muster? Arguably, the nexus between the proceeds and
the underlying policy is too strong to be entirely ignored, foreclosing the
conclusion that proceeds are not an interest in the policy itself.
Even if one could successfully divorce the proceeds from the underlying
policy and avoid the former from being considered a subsection (d)(2)
"interest" proper in the latter, escaping the grasp of section 2035 is not
assured. it is submitted that the "interest" contemplated by subsection
(d)(2) is not a true property interest per se, but embraces all rights, powers
and other indicia of control over property which results in estate tax
accountability under the sections specifically enumerated in subsection (d)(2).
Thus, for the purposes of applying section 2042, "incidents of ownership"
are the relevant indicia of control. Following this approach puts life insurance on equal footing with other types of property subject to estate
taxation (a goal set by, Congress when it introduced the "incidents of
ownership" test),199 and harmonizes the overall application and effect of
subsection (d)(2).
To support this point, consider the impact of subsection (d)(2) on the
following transaction. Decedent transfers property to donee reserving in
himself a life estate. If the decedent retains that interest until death, there
is no question that the property is includable in the gross estate under
section 2036. What is the result if the decedent divests himself of the life
estate prior to death? Section 2035(d)(2) indicates that if the decedent's
transfer of the final "string" occurs more than 3 years prior to death
there is no estate tax inclusion of the property, but if transferred within
three years of death the property is included in the gross estate. This
follows from the wording in the statute that requires tax accountability
for a transfer within 3 years of death of a property interest that "would
have been included under [section 2036] if such interest had been retained

199. See R. STEPHENS, G. MAXFImLD & S. LiND, supra note 35, §§ 4.14(g)(b),
4.14(9)(b).
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by the decedent." 2 00 As noted above, had the decedent retained the life

estate until death, the property would be included in his gross estate. The
statute clearly fits the transaction into the (d)(2) exception and creates tax
exposure-or does it? In order for (d)(2) to apply the decedent must have
transferred an "interest in property." Is a life estate such an interest?
Section 2036 specifically identifies "possession," "enjoyment," and
"rights" in and over transferred property as its triggering mechanisms.
While any of these could rise to the level of a recognizable, enforceable
property interest, that is not necessary for the section to apply. The
regulations make it quite clear that mere understandings, express or implied,
can be the source of the taxable right. 20' The regulations also use the
disjunctive "or" when referring to the triggering mechanisms, 20 2 permitting
one to conclude that a difference between a taxable right over transferred
property and a taxable interest retained in transferred property is recognized.
Does this mean that Congress intended to have subsection (d)(2) apply to
section 2036 transfers only when a section 2036-type taxable "interest" is
relinquished or transferred within 3 years of death, but not when a section
2036-type taxing "right" is similarly disposed of? Assuredly not! If one
of the purposes of section 2035 is to prevent property (otherwise subject
to section 2036) controlled until (or close to) death from escaping proper
tax accounting, it would make no sense to excuse some section 2036 transfers
but not others. The better view of the subsection (d)(2) meaning of "interest" is to consider it as the "taxing interest" as defined in the enumerated
sections themselves, rather than as a true property interest.
Applying this rationale to life insurance leads one to conclude that if
a decedent transferred an incident of ownership within three years of death,
that event alone should force estate tax accounting for the corresponding
20 3
policy. Interestingly, the regulations can be read to support this view.
Moreover, it has been suggested that failure to recognize "incidents of
ownership" as the appropriate subsection (d)(2) interests would make a
"mockery" of the estate tax treatment of life insurance in general. 204
If incidents of ownership are the triggering interests for subjecting life
insurance transfers to section 2035 treatment, then it has to be determined

200.
201.
202.
203.

I.R.C. § 2035(d)(2).
Treas. Reg. § 20.2036-1(a) (1988).
Id.
See Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-1(c)(1) (1988). It permits the exclusion of

proceeds from the gross estate if the decedent neither possessed any incidents of
ownership at death nor transferred "them in contemplation of death. . .

."

Id.

The message is clear: a transfer of an incident of ownership is a transfer of an
interest for the purposes of section 2035. Although interpreting the Phase II
provision, the Phase III version contains nothing to indicate that this perception
of an "incident of ownership" as an "interest" has changed. A sound argument
is difficult to fashion to the effect that an "incident of ownership" was an "interest"
in property for the purposes of subsection (a), but not for subsection (d)(2).
R. STEPHENS,
MAxFILD & S. LI-D, supra note 35, § 4.14(9)(b).
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whether an interest in proceeds passed by a constructive transfer is an
incident of ownership in the policy. One must conclude that it is. Incidents
of ownership are conceptually tied to the economic benefits of the policy
which, according to Congress, represents the requisite control for taking
life insurance? °5 What greater benefit could exist than the right to receive
2°6
or decide who receives the fruit of the policy-its proceeds?
The transfer of proceeds incident to a constructive transfer is identical
20 8
2°7
to the designation of beneficiaries under a group term or split-dollar
insurance plan. In both of these situations, if the decedent possessed only
the right to designate the recipient of the proceeds, an incident of ownership
in the policy, and corresponding estate tax accountability under section
2042, has been found. 209 If the analogy holds, there can be little doubt

that an interest in the proceeds is an incident of ownership in the underlying
policy.
Leder correctly notes that a decedent must have owned an interest in

an insurance policy transferred within three years of death in order for
section 2035 to pull the proceeds of the policy into the decedent's gross
estate. The Leder court then concluded that the decedent never had such
an interest, and therefore section 2035 did not apply. It is submitted,
however, that a "constructive transferor" of life insurance does possess
and pass the requisite interest-an "imputed" one. Therefore, under a
proper interpretation of section 2035, constructive transfers of life insurance
within 3 years of death are still includable in the decedent-transferor's gross

205. Treasury Regulation 20.2042-1(c)(2) specifically states that "the term
incidents of ownership is not limited in its meaning to ownership of the policy in
the technical legal sense. Generally speaking, the term has reference to the right
of the insured or his estate to the economic benefits of the policy. Thus, it includes
the power to change the beneficiary, to surrender or cancel the policy, to assign
the policy, to revoke an assignment, to pledge the policy for a loan, or to obtain
from the insurer a loan against the surrender value of the policy, etc." Treas.
Reg. § 20.2042-1(c)(2) (1988).
206. It has been said that the capacity to affect the disposition of the proceeds
is central to taxability. Estate of Smead v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 43, 48 (1982).
207. A group term insurance plan usually provides insurance coverage for
individual plan members through a master policy. The individuals have no control
over the master policy but do, in most instances, have power of disposition over
the proceeds covering themselves. See Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-1(c)(6) (1988).
208. A split dollar insurance plan confers upon the payor of the premium
(usually an employer) ownership in the underlying policy and a right to proceeds
in an amount either equal to the premiums paid until the insured's death or the
cash value of the policy. The insured is usually an employee who has power of
disposition over the proceeds. See Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-1(c)(6) (1988).
209. In both group term and split dollar plans, the insured's right to control
the proceeds is an "incident of ownership" forcing estate tax accounting for the
proceeds pursuant to section 2042. Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-1(c)(6) (1988); cf. Landorf
v. United States, 408 F.2d 461 (Ct. Cl. 1969); Schwager v. Commissioner, 64 T.C.
781 (1975). See generally Treas. Reg. § 20-2042-1(c)(2) (1988).
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estate. The imputed interest is either of the entire policy, as suggested by
Bel, or, at the least, of an incident of ownership in the policy. It is
suggested that "incidents of ownership" should be considered the proper
measuring sticks for determining the requisite subsection (d)(2) interest
because they are the taxing mechanism for life insurance pursuant to section
2042.
Concededly, life insurance is included in the gross estate under other
sections without reference to "incidents of ownership." For example, when
seeking to include a policy owned by a decedent on the life of another,
the policy is treated under section 2033 like any other asset. 210 But that
section clearly operates independently of section 2042. It makes little, if
any, tax sense to have the "incidents of ownership" test control the taxation
of insurance under section 2042 proper, but abandon that approach when
direct reference to section 2042 is made elsewhere in the statute. By treating
an incident of ownership as the subsection (d)(2) interest and then imputing
its existence to the transferor prior to a constructive transfer of an insurance
policy, the purpose of the section is preserved; life insurance is accorded
equal treatment with other property, and sound tax policy is advanced.
Indeed, treating an incident of ownership as an interest in the policy itself
for all transfer tax purposes might well prove to be a prudent position to
take.
It is curious that the Tax Court had no difficulty in looking to the
entirety of the transaction when it found constructive transfers in Phase
II Bel-type cases, but was only able to focus on technicalities and a narrow
reading of the statute in Phase III. Both phases require the pre-transfer
existence of an interest before the section in each respective era could be
applied. Why was the interest readily recognizable in Phase II but not
Phase III? The Leder court was content to read the Phase III statute
literally: there must be a pre-existing interest before the subsection (d)(2)
exception can apply. Absent the pre-existing interest, there was no need
to determine whether or not a transfer was made. But in the constructive
transfer setting, it is the recognition of the transfer itself that is first
essential to the possible discovery of an interest. Why the court was willing
to resort to this sleight-of-hand in Phase III after having rejected it in
Phase II is a mystery.
The Leder court may have been trying to distinguish the pre-requisite
of the more abstract interest needed in Phase II from the concretely defined
one required in Phase III. But, given the conclusions drawn in Bel and
Oregon, the distinction appears illusory. The reality is that courts recognizing
constructive transfers also admit to the existence of imputed interests, for

210. Estate of Du Pont v. Commissioner, 233 F.2d 210 (3rd Cir.), cert.
denied, 352 U.S. 878 (1956); Estate of Donaldson v. Commissioner, 31 T.C. 729
(1959).
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without the latter there cahnot be the former. The line drawn by Leder
is unjustifiable.
Concededly, not every instance when a decedent lends his or her name
to an insurance application Will or should result in estate tax accounting.
The truly passive participant is insulated from section 2035 taxation for
want of a constructive transfer. But, in those instances where the "constructive transfer" doctrine could be applied, there seems to be no logical
reason to restrict its use in Phase III. Even-handed statutory interpretation
would seem to dictate that if the courts may look beyond the technicalities
of the transaction to "construct" a transfer, the same effort should be
made in order to "impute'.' the interest that was the subject of such a
transfer. Indeed, without an imputed interest, there is nothing for the
constructive transfer to transmit. Should it turn out that the "imputed
interest" is not a section 2042 "incident of ownership," so be it; the

transaction escapes taxation based upon a proper interpretation of the
statute. It is suggested, however, that constructive transfers pass along
imputed interests which are properly classifiable as incidents of ownership
under section 2042 and, in turn, as subsection (d)(2) interests. The consequence of this realization is a rejection of Leder's limited reading of
section 2035(d) and identical tax treatment in Phase III for "constructive
transfers" as was given in Phase II.
If imputed interests continue to go unrecognized by the courts, Congress
will have to act if it is dissatisfied with Leder. A simple remedy lies in
a rewording of subsection (d)(2) or extending the subsection (b) "exception
to the exception" for life insurance to the entire section. Before any such
move is made, fiowever, a determination of the desired result should be
contemplated. Are Leder-type transactions the kind of taxpayer activities
Congress wants to sanction? Should there be approved "maneuvers" by
which the form will overshadow the substance and permit otherwise taxable
events to fall through the cracks in the statute? If so, is this one of the
maneuvers?
"
It is suggested that a review of the legislative history of section 2035
reveals Leder to be contrary to the purpose and intent of the section which
was designed to provent dissipation of the estate tax base. Indeed, this
rationale was used to establish the constructive transfer doctrine for life
insurance in the first place. Even after the change to Phase III exclusion,
the sense of Congress seemed to be to permit post-transfer appreciation
to escape estate taxation primarily because the value of the gift itself was
already in the overall tax calculus. 21' In essence, it was a determination

211. By operition of se6tion 2001(b), an estate tax is computed first on the
tentative tax base-an'amount comprised of the gross estate plus all adjusted taxable
gifts not otherwise included in the gross estate. I.R.C. § 2001(b) (1986). Thus, all
gifts are either tax-accounted-for during life, or at death by effectively pushing the
estate into higher marginal tax brackets.
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that complete divestment of ownership ought not to go unrecognized. Yet,
Congress was cognizant that life insurance by its very nature is so deathoriented, appreciation-laden, that it ought to be singled out for special
treatment; and it was. Did this view change or is the statute as presently
worded an unfortunate result of sloppy drafting procedures? Perhaps if

section 2035 had been rewritten in its entirety, rather than having been
subject to piecemeal revision, a clearer picture of the true Congressional

intent would have come into focus. But wondering what "might have been"
must now take a back seat to "what should be." If Leder survives review,
Congress must determine whether it is satisfied with I.R.C. section 2035
in its present form and whether the section now capably serves its intended
purpose.
V.

CONCLUSION

In deciding Leder, the Tax Court handed tax planners an opportunity
for passing on substantial wealth estate tax free. In doing so, the court
took a step away from its usual "substance over form" posture and gave
the tax statute a literal interpretation. Although the approach is not totally
without precedent, in this particular instance, it was perhaps surprising
given the inhospitable treatment constructive transfers of life insurance had
received in the recent past. The onus is now on the defenders of the federal
treasury to assess whether the Leder result can be countenanced. Serious
consideration ought to be given to the recognition of an imputed interest
corollary to the constructive transfer doctrine so that these types of activities
do not escape proper tax accounting. Regardless, in the near future, it
should become known whether taxpayers will be forced to continue paying
the tax or whether they can safely follow this Leder.
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